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Rochstein: Rethinking the Joint and Several Liability of Lenders Under CERCL

RETHINKING THE JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY OF LENDERS
UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION

Industry pollutes.' One consequence of an expanding economy is the
industrial production of hazardous wastes.' Out of sight and out of mind;
industry polluted without any regard for the dangers to human health and the
environment. 3 In 1978, however, the hazardous waste problem began to attract
massive public attention with the Love Canal disaster.4

1. BERNARD J. NEBEL, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 314 (1981). From a broad point of view,
industry encompasses all human endeavors to provide a better material life. Every level of industry
- obtaining raw materials, manufacturing, using products, and ultimately disposing of products produces wastes that are discharged into the environment. The whole of the industrial society that
desires, produces, and uses products is to blame for the creation of industrial pollution. Id.
2. Wastes do not accumulate to unmanageable levels if the production of pollutants is balanced
by dilution and assimilation. The problem, however, is not that natural processes do not work, but
rather, that the critical balance is exceeded. This comes about in three basic ways: (1)
overproduction of wastes; (2) introduction of unique chemicals; and (3) reduction of assimilative
capacity. NEBEL, supra note 1, at 315.
3. The casual attitude toward pollution is underlaid by one or more of the following
assumptions:
(1) Threshold level: It is assumed that below a certain level of concentration, pollutants
will have no ill effect.
(2) Dilution: It is assumed that pollutants will mix freely in air and/or water and will
thus be diluted below threshold levels.
(3) Assimilation: It is assumed that wastes will re-enter the natural biological or
geochemical cycles of the earth.
(4) Immobility of solid wastes: It is assumed that solid wastes will stay where they are
put.
(5) Accidents will not happen: In all our activities we tend to assume that accidents (oil
spills, chemical leaks) will not occur.
NEBEL, supra note 1, at 314.
4. Peter N. Lavalette, The Security InterestExemption Under CERCLA: imely Relieffrom the
EPA, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 473, 476 (1993). The Superfund was high on the Carter Administration
agenda after the Love Canal disaster in New York State. Brent Nicholson & Todd Zuiderhoek, The
Lender Liability Dilemma: Fleet Factors History and Aftermath, 38 S.D. L. REV. 705 (1990).
Massive leaks of toxic wastes one-quarter mile outside Niagara Falls were discovered in 1978,
forcing 236 families to abandon their homes. In the Mid-1890s, Love Canal was started as a
navigational canal linking Lake Ontario with the Niagara River, but the work was never finished.
Id. In the 1930s, it was used as an industrial dump site. Owner Hooker Chemical sold the parcel
to the county in 1953, and, shortly thereafter, homes and a school were built over the site. Id.
Twenty years later, odors were noticed in basements, remnants of chemical were found, and air
monitoring tests revealed heavy organic vapor concentrations. The EPA had no authority to act at
the time and could only offer technical advice. Id. See also Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel,
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Hazardous waste is the result of the use and production of toxic chemicals
by industry.' Chemicals produced by industry are often lethal and must be
stored and disposed of with the utmost care. 6 Unfortunately, negligent storage
and disposal practices within the industrial community led to severe
contamination through "leaching," the process in which rainfall combines with
leaking hazardous waste and migrates into groundwater supplies, lakes, and
7
ivers.
To facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites in the United States,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Acte (CERCLA) in 1980.
CERCLA empowered the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean up inactive hazardous waste
sites and to recover the costs from responsible parties.9 A site is usually
abandoned,"0 however, because the business that owns the property normally

LenderLiability Underthe ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse, CompensationandLiability Act,
41 S.C. L. REV. 705 (1990); Nicolas M. Kublicki, Comment, Shockwave: Lender Liability Under
CERCLA Afier United States v. Fleet Factors Corporation, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 513, 518 (1991).
5. Hazardous waste is any discarded material that may pose a substantial threat or potential
hazard to human health or the environment. G. TYLER MILLER, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 378
(2d ed. 1988).
6. About 96% of hazardous waste is generated and either stored or treated on site by large
companies - chemical producers, petroleum refineries, and manufacturers. Id. at 380.
7. Historically, industrial by products such as ethylene, sulfur-dioxide, and carbon monoxide
were present in nature and could be assimilated into the environment. However, many of today's
industrial by products do not occur naturally and cannot be similarly assimilated. See NEBEL, supra
note 1, at 316. These by products pose a threat to human health by leaching into groundwater
supplies. Because rainwater eventually ends up in groundwater supplies, the process of leaching
often pollutes water supplies near hazardous waste sites where chemical waste drums have leaked.
See id. at 165, 238.
Chemicals dumped in the environment are often diluted and consequently pose a lesser risk
to humans and other living organisms. Id. Sometimes, however, chemicals appear in organisms
at higher levels of concentration.
Id.
This process is called "bioaccumulation" or
"biomagnification."
One example of biomagnification occurred when the pesticide
Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) that was used commonly in the 1960s, was ingested by
insects that were consumed by certain animals. Id. Scientists believed that DDT would be diluted
in the environment. Id. Instead, the biomagnification in certain animals caused severe reproductive
failures and deaths, especially in birds that consumed contaminated insects.
Id.
The
biomagnification of DDT was responsible for the near extinction of the American bald eagle. See
id. at 342-43.
8. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 95 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp.
1993)), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1988).
9. "Responsible parties" is a broad term that includes many different individuals and
companies. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
10. CERCLA was enacted in order to establish a mechanism to respond to problems and costs
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. H.R. REP. No. 1016 (part
I & II),
96th Cong., 2d Seas. 22 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
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goes bankrupt," and in most instances lacks the funds necessary to reimburse
the EPA for its costs.' 2 When the business cannot reimburse the EPA, the
government may attempt to collect its cleanup costs from other deep pocket
sources, such as banks.' 3 Banks have been caught in the liability net of
CERCLA because they loan money4 to polluting businesses that are secured by
an interest in the business facility.'
When CERCLA was promulgated, Congress included an exemption,
commonly called the security interest exemption,15 that excluded from liability
those persons "who, without participating in the management of a facility, hold
indicia of ownership 6 primarily to protect a security interest." 7 The security
interest exemption is at the center of the environmental lender liability
controversy between the government and lending institutions. 8

11. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (Bergsoe went into involuntary
bankruptcy); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (the borrowt;r
filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D.
Pa. 1989) (the borrower defaulted on the loan so the bank foreclosed); United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (the borrower failed to make payments on the
loan so the bank instituted a foreclosure action); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (the borrower filed a petition for bankruptcy); In re T.P. Long Chemical
Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (the borrower filed for reorganization under
chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code).
12. The cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site often exceeds the amount that the lender
invested against the security of the property. Ann M. Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCL4: Ttle
and Liability, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 317, 323 (1988). Consequently, lenders often face the
possibility of a much greater economic burden than was originally anticipated when they made their
loans. Id.
13. Kublicki, supra note 4, at 513. Banks have been hard hit by cleanup liability under
CERCLA because the government sees their large assets and capital reserves as easy targets for
recovering cleanup costs. Id. at 513 n.5.
14. Id. at 513.
15. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 300.1100, 300.1105
(1992)) (referring to the statutory elements that protect secured creditors as the "security interest
exemption"); Brian J. McGaughan, "CERCL4ing" the Field of Lender Liability: Clarifying the
Security Interest Exemption, 4 ViLL. ENvrL. L.J. 89 (1993) (questioning when a lender should lose
the "security interest exemption" and when the lender should be considered an owner under
CERCLA).
16. "Indicia" is defined as "[sligns; indications." "Circumstances which point to the existence
of a given fact as probable, but not certain." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 772 (6th ed. 1990).
"Indicia of ownership" refers to lenders who have loaned funds to a business and then take technical
title to the property in order to secure the loan. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.1100(a) (1992).
17. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. This phrase is contained within CERCLA's
definition of "owner or operator." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 133) [hereinafter the
"security interest exemption"]
18. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F.
Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1995

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 [1995], Art. 8

1420

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

CERCLA has been interpreted by the courts as imposing joint and several
liability.' 9 If a court finds a lender liable for costs the EPA incurred when it
cleaned up a contaminated hazardous waste facility, the lender could potentially
bear the responsibility for the entire cost of the cleanup.' This interpretation,
as establishing joint and several liability, means that any single party may be
sued for the entire cost of cleanup whether or not other parties are joined in the
suit. 2 When the polluter has defaulted on its loan, the lender may be the only
defendant left with the financial ability to pay for the cleanup. 2 Moreover, an
expansive interpretation of the scope of liable parties under CERCLA could
implicate innocent lenders whose seemingly innocent activities lead to a finding
of liability for harm they never caused.
This Note will examine the lender liability dilemma in relation to
CERCLA's imposition of joint and several liability. The lender liability
controversy evolved through an inconsistent body of case law' and became a
full blown crisis when the Eleventh Circuit handed down a decision that
potentially narrowed the protection that CERCLA affords to lenders.24 The
EPA responded to the problem and issued an interpretive rule defming
The rule provided a basic
CERCLA's security interest exemption. 25
framework for banks to follow to avoid liability but failed to address the root of
the problem: the potential for courts to impose joint and several liability.
Although no case concerning lender liability has ever addressed the issue in light
of CERCLA's imposition of joint and several liability, this Note will show why
courts should consider the two issues together. Lenders are in a unique position
because they typically become involved in facilities containing hazardous wastes
after the owner goes bankrupt. Joint and several liability may impose on lenders

Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re T.P. Long

Chem. Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
19. Bell Petroleum Servs. Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993); Hastings
Bldg. Prod. v. National Aluminum Corp., 1991 WL 350042, at *9 (W.D. Mich. May 13, 1991);
Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D. Mich. 1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883
F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
20. Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 4, at 40.

21. Id.
22. Id.; See also, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Md. 1986) (the court held the lender liable for over $400,000 in cleanup costs while the loan to the
polluting borrower was only $335,000). See also Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, To Lend
or Not to Lend - That Should Not Be the Question: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability under

CERCLA, 41 DuKE L.J. 1211, 1211 n.3 (1992).
23.

See infra notes 144-249 and accompanying text.

24. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1ith Cir. 1990).
25. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 300.1100, 300.1105 (1992)).
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a disproportionate burden for the reimbursement of costs incurred by the EPA
because the bankrupt owner no longer has the resources for such reimbursement.
This Note will argue that courts should not apply joint and several liability to
lenders in certain situations. 6
Section II of this Note will provide an overview of the relevant statutory
provisions contained in CERCLA." The legislative history will be discussed
to show how Congress failed to clearly direct the courts as to the meaning of the
security interest exemption.' Section III will address how the federal courts
and Congress have dealt with joint and several liability under CERCLA and will
show why lenders are exposed to unique problems as a result. 9 Section IV
will proceed with a discussion of the inconsistent federal case law regarding
lender liability and will show why the EPA addressed the issue with its own
interpretation of the security interest exemption.' Section V will provide an
analysis of the EPA's lender liability rule and will show why the EPA or
Congress should address the issue of joint and several liability?' Finally,
Section VI will propose an alternative method of liability allocation for courts
32
to apply to lenders that fail to qualify for the security interest exemption.
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA

A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
CERCLA is better known as the Superfund Law.33 Congress originally
allocated $1.6 billion in 1980 - to finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.

26. But see Burkhart, supra note 12, at 382-83. The joint and several liability standard
provides important advantages to the EPA. Id. First, joint and several liability significantly
simplifies the EPA's pretrial investigations and its burden of establishing liability during the trial.
Id. Rather than finding each potential defendant, the EPA can choose one or more defendants based
on accessibility and ability to satisfy a judgment. Id.
Second, joint and several liability simplifies the EPA's burden of proving causation. In the
absence of joint and several liability, the EPA could recover damages from a defendant only to the
extent that the EPA could prove the actual amount of damage that a particular defendant caused.
Id. This burden of proof would be impossible to satisfy. Id.
Finally, joint and several liability enhances the EPA's ability to recover all of its response
costs. Id. In the absence of joint and several liability, the EPA could recover the full amount of
its response costs only if all responsible parties could be located and were sufficiently solvent to pay
their portion of the response costs. Id.
27. See infra notes 33-69 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 84-134 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 135-249 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 250-315 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 316-52 and accompanying text.
33. Lavalette, supra note 4, at 474.
34. Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 4, at 26.
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In 1986, CERCLA was amended and an additional $8.5 billion was authorized
for Superfund use.' s Finally, in late 1990, an additional $5.1 billion was
granted to the fund for the period from October 1, 1991, to September 30,
1994.36
These funds were earmarked for the removal and remediation
(cleanup) of hazardous waste from sites designated by the EPA. 3 The EPA
has prioritized hazardous waste sites on a National Priorities List that contains
the sites that present the most serious threats to health and the environment. 38
When passing CERCLA, Congress had two goals. First, Congress wanted
to allow the federal government to address hazardous waste problems
promptly." To do so, the Superfund was created to identify and remediate
sites containing hazardous waste.' ° Second, Congress wanted, to the extent
possible, to impose the cost of remediation on the responsible parties."' In
furtherance of the second goal, CERCLA authorizes the EPA to: 1) order a
responsible party to clean up the site and impose fines of up to $25,000 per day
for non-compliance;42 2) seek an injunction to compel a responsible party to
clean up the site;43 and 3) clean up the site itself using Superfund money and

35. Id. The 1986 increase was implemented through the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) to allow for a more aggressive effort to combat the waste cleanup
problem. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1988).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The sites have been ranked from most to least serious and from this list, the EPA
determines the order in which the sites will be remediated.
39. Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAw. 923, 925 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
40. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
41. Barr, supra note 39, at 925 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7
(1989)). "Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created." Id.
(quoting Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112). See also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) provides in part:
Any person who wilfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply with, any order of the
President... may, in an action brought in the appropriate United States district court
to enforce such order, be fined not more than $5,000 for each day in which such
violation occurs or such failure to comply continues.
Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) provides in part:
[Wihen the president determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual
or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the
Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate
such danger or threat ....
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to seek recovery from responsible parties.'

Although the statute does not directly refer to the type of liability imposed
on responsible parties, the courts have interpreted CERCLA as providing for
both strict liability and joint and several liability. ' In other words, after the
EPA has incurred cleanup costs at a hazardous waste site, those parties deemed
liable under CERCLA must pay for the entire cost of the cleanup."4 Liability
is imposed regardless of culpability, fault, or intent, and it is retroactive in
nature. "7

Under § 9607 of CERCLA, a party is deemed potentially responsible if the
party is: a past or present owner or operator ' of a facility where hazardous
wastes have contaminated the surrounding environment; a generator of
hazardous wastes that were deposited at the site;49 or a transporter of hazardous

44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1994). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel . . . or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(1) of this title.
45. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1991); United
States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 930, 942 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
46. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
47. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that
CERCLA's retroactivity does not violate due process), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) & (2) (1988).
49. Id. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
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wastes to the site designated for remediation.' If a party is found liable under
one of the preceding categories, the party will be liable for: cleanup costs
incurred by the government; ' costs incurred by non-government private
citizens for the cleanup of hazardous wastes;52 damages to natural resources;53
and costs of any necessary health assessments.'
CERCLA enumerates three defenses that potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) can use to avoid liability.'
The PRP must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the release of hazardous substances was
caused solely by an act of God,' 6 an act of war,"7 or was the sole act or
omission of a third party who had no contractual relationship with the party.'
Additionally, the third party defense is available only if the PRP exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, and the PRP took
precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party.59
In 1986, Congress created a new defense to account for innocent
landowners by redefining the term "contractual relationship."6 The innocent
landowner defense is available to purchasers of property who neither knew nor
had any reason to know that hazardous substances were disposed on the

50. Id. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1994). The EPA's cleanup costs include the cost
of removal and remedial action.
"Removal" is generally a short-term remedy undertaken when the contamination is first
discovered. It includes, but is not limited to, costs involved in physically removing the
hazardous substances; disposing of the removed material; monitoring, assessing, and
evaluating the risk of further contamination; and providing security fencing, alternative
water supplies, and temporary housing for threatened individuals. "Remedial action"
is a longer-term, more permanent remedy and includes storage, confinement, cover,
cleanup, recycling, reuse, dredging, excavation, and the like.
Id. See Margaret Murphy, 7he Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on
Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 BUs. LAw. 1133, 1137-38 (1986). See also 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (1988).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
53. Id. § 9607(a),(f) (West Supp. 1994).
54. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
55. Id. § 9607(b) (West Supp. 1994).
56. Id. § 9607(b)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
58. Id. § 9607(b)(3) (West Supp. 1994). See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 4, at 709.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (West Supp. 1994).
60. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1988). In 1986, SARA modified the third party defense by defining the term
"contractual relationship" to include instruments transferring title or possession to real property
unless the purchaser did not know or have reason to know that hazardous substances had been
disposed on the property. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (west Supp. 1994).
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property. 6 To invoke the innocent landowner defense, purchasers of real
property must show that prior to the purchase, they made "all appropriate
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability."6 2
Congress defined the term "owner or operator" in CERCLA as "any person
owning or operating" a facility.' This definition provides little guidance to

61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1994). Today, in order to establish the third
party defense, a defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it: (1) exercised
due care with regard to the hazardous substance; (2) took precautions against the foreseeable acts
or omissions of the third party; and (3) purchased the property without knowing or having reason
to know that the property was contaminated by hazardous substances. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1994). In deciding whether a defendant has made
an appropriate inquiry, courts are directed to consider any expertise possessed by the defendant, the
purchase price of the property compared to its value if uncontaminated, reasonably ascertainable
information about the property, the obviousness of the contamination at the site and the ability to
detect such contamination by an appropriate inspection. Id.
63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1994). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)-(D)
provides in part:
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility
or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case
of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure,
tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a state or local government, any
person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
immediately beforehand.
Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id. Furthermore, regardless of ownership, a person is liable, if responsible for polluting or
disposing of hazardous materials, where a contractual relationship exists or where the person agrees
to transport the materials. Following the definition of "owner or operator," CERCLA provides:
(B) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been accepted for transportation by
a common or contract carrier and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of this
title, (i) the term "owner or operator" shall mean such common carrier or other bona
fide for hire carrier acting as an independent contractor during such transportation, (ii)
the shipper of such hazardous substance shall not be considered to have caused or
contribued to any release during such transportation which resulted solely from
circumstances or conditions beyond his control.
(C) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been delivered by a common or
contract carrier to a disposal or treatment facility and except as provided in section
9607(a)(3) or (4) of this title, (i) the term "owner or operator" shall not include such
common or contract carrier, and (ii) such common or contract carrier shall not be
considered to have caused or contributed to any release at such disposal or treatment
facility resulting from circumstances or conditions beyond its control.
(D) The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government
which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires
title by virtue of its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph
shall not apply to any State or local government which caused or contributed to the
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courts as to what actually constitutes ownership and operation." The confusion
regarding the definition of "owner or operator" is furthered by Congress'
With respect to lenders,
definition of the security interest exemption.'
CERCLA provides, the term "[owner or operator] does not include a person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility."' The statute provides no guidance, however, on the meanings of
two key phrases: "indicia of ownership, primarily to protect [a] security
interest," and "participating in management."'67 Moreover, the scant legislative
history available on the security interest exemption and the varying
interpretations provided by the federal courts have caused considerable concern
in the lending community." Lenders are prime targets because they are easy
to locate, are joined in cleanup cost recovery actions, and often have deep
pockets to pay the massive judgments rendered in CERCLA liability suits. '
B. Legislative History of the Security Interest Exemption
Because the language used on the face of the security interest exemption is
vague, courts have often looked to the legislative history' of CERCLA for
guidance. 7 Unfortunately, the legislative history?2 concerning the security

release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State
or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner
and to the same extent both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental
entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20) (West Supp. 1994). See supra notes 44, 48-54 for the pertinent parts of
§ 9607(a)(1)-(4).

64. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
66. Id.
67. Lavalette, supra note 4,at478.
68. Id.
69. The "deep pocket theory" advocates placing the loss on those most able to bear the loss.
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 40 (1970). Calabresi's deep pocket theory states that
losses can be reduced most by placing them on the categories of people least likely to suffer
substantial economic or social dislocation as a result of bearing the costs, usually thought to be the
wealthy. Id.
70. For a complete discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see Frank P. Grad, A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
"Superfund"Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.ENvTL. L. 1 (1982).
71. The legislative history of CERCLA is uninformative, however. The report of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on an earlier version of the legislation that eventually
"persons
became CERCLA stated only that the provision was intended to exclude from liability
possessing indicia of ownership (such as a financial institution) who, without participating in the
management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in
connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or
regulations." H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6160, 6181.
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interest exemption also gives little insight into the extent of liability that
Congress intended to apply to lenders.' 3 An examination of the legislative
history does provide evidence, however, that Congress created the security
interest exemption to accommodate the two different approaches states take in
regard to the assignment of title after a mortgage is executed.74
The majority of states follow the lien theory of title assignment, where a
mortgage does not convey title to the property to the lender.75 Instead, the
mortgage creates only the right to sell the property in the case of default. 76
The approach taken by most other states,77 the title theory, characterizes a
mortgage as actually conveying the title of the mortgaged property to the
lender. ' Therefore, in title theory states, ownership vests in the lender, while
in lien theory states, no title is conveyed.'
Without the security interest exemption, all lenders in title theory states

72. CERCLA was actually the product of three bills of the 96th Congress: H.R. 7020, H.R.
85, and S. 1480. Grad, supra note 70, at 2.

73. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578, 579 (D. Md.
1986). One commentator said that it is somewhat inaccurate to refer to CERCLA's legislative
history. Burkhart, supra note 12, at 324 n.15.
Although Congress had worked on "Superfund" toxic and hazardous vaste cleanup bills
and on parallel oil spill bills for over three years, the actual bill which became law had
virtually no legislative history at all. The bill which became law was hurriedly put
together by a bipartisan leadership group of senators (with some assistance from their
House counterparts), introduced, and passed by the Senate in lieu of all other pending
It was considered on December 3, 1980, in the closing
measures on the subject ....
days of the lame duck session of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed,
after very limited debate, under a suspension of the rules, in a situation which allowed
for no amendments. Faced with a complicated bill on a take-it-or-leave it basis, the
House took it, groaning all the way.
Id. (quoting Grad, supra note 70, at 1) (footnote omitted).
74. See Burkhart, supra note 12, at 338. Although the distinction between title and indicia of
ownership is technical, an examination of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) reveals that Congress intended
to draw this distinction. Id. The first sentence of the "owner or operator" distinction applies to
persons "owning" or who "owned" the affected property, when the property has been abandoned,
whereas the security interest exemption applies to persons who hold "indicia of ownership." Id.
A reference to holding indicia of ownership indicates that such ownership is not ownership in the
usual sense but is given to serve another purpose, to secure a loan. Id. The logical conclusion is
that the security interest exemption applies only to holders of security interests and not to persons
who own property. Id. at 339.
75. Burkhart, supra note 12, at 338 (citing Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger,
40 VAND. L. REv. 283, 327 (1987)).
76. Burkhart, supra note 12, at 338 (footnote omitted).
77. Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Pennsylvania describe a mortgage as conveying title to the mortgage. See Burkhart, supra note 12,
at 322-24.
78. See Burkhart, supra note 12, at 339.
79. See Lavalette, supra note 4, at 479.
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would be owners based on their possession of title.' The result would be that
lenders, as title holders, would be potentially liable for CERCLA response costs
when they did not participate in the operations of the contaminated facility. 8'
Congressional concern about the title and lien theory distinction reveals that it
included the security interest exemption in CERCLA to accommodate that
distinction.' Congress intended for the security interest exemption to exclude
title theory lenders from the definition of "owner" because title vested in such
lenders only by operation of law.83
III.
A.

JOINT AND SEVERAL LmBLrrY

UNDER CERCLA

The Legislative History

An examination of the legislative history of CERCLA provides some insight
into the scope of liabilit9 intended by Congress. Both the House and the
Senate proposed bills" that were integrated and eventually became CERCLA.
First, the House billse contained the most lenient version of the imposition of
joint and several liability.' Representative Gore introduced an amendment that
addressed the concern that relatively small contributors would not be able to
prove their lack of contribution and would face joint and several liability as a
result.' Under the Gore Amendment, the court had the power to impose joint
and several liability whenever defendants could not prove their contribution."

80. Id.
81. Id. If CERCLA equated title with ownership, similarly situated mortgage holders would
be held liable in some states and not others. The security interest exemption eliminated this potential
for unequal treatment, provided the mortgage holder has no greater interest in the encumbered land.
Burkhart, supra note 12, at 339.
82. See Burkhart, supra note 12, at 339. Representative Harsha explained that the purpose of
the exemption was to shield titleholders who have not participated in management from liability.
See Lavalette, supra note 4, at 479; Greenberg & Shaw, supra note 22, at 1213. Representative
LaFalce stated that the security interest exemption was inserted to recognize the difference between
title and lien theory states. 135 CONG. RiEc. E1325 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep.
LaFalce).
83. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
84. Scope of liability in the context of this note refers to whether the lenders held liable under
CERCLA will be jointly and severally liable.
85. The relevant bills to this discussion are H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) and S.
1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
86. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Congressman Florio introduced the bill entitled
the "Hazardous Waste Contaminant Act," on April 2, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. 7490 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 1980). The bill proposed to regulate inactive sites bearing hazardous wastes on land and in nonnavigable waters, by a regime of reporting, cleanup and monitoring.
87. Ellen J. Sokol, Joint and Several Liability Under CERCL4-United States v. United ChemDyne Corp., 57 TEMP. L.Q. 885, 896 (1984).
88. Sokol, supra note 87, at 896.
89. H.R. 7020 § 3071(a), 126 CONG. REc. 26,779 (1980).
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In addition, the amendment authorized the courts to apportion damages
according to a number of equitable factors.' Some relevant parts included: the
ability of the parties to demonstrate their relative contributions; the amount of
hazardous waste involved; and the degree of involvement and care of the parties

regarding the disposal of the hazardous waste.9 The Gore Amendment was
adopted by the House and became part of the House bill. 92
In the Senate, the Committee on Environment and Public Works presented
a bill that contained liability provisions that were more stringent than those of
the House bill.'
The Senate's version9 would have imposed joint and
several liability unless two conditions were met: first, that the defendant could
prove its own contribution to the contamination; 95 and second, that the
defendant's contribution to the harm was not a significant factor in causing the
discharge."
The issue ofjoint and several liability was highly controversial, though, and
90. H.R. 7020 § 3071(a)(2)(B), (as amended), 126 CoNG. REc. 26,781 (1980).
91. The Gore Amendment to H.R. 7020 provided:
(B) To the extent apportionment is not established under subparagraph (A), the court
may apportion the liability among the parties where deemed appropriate based upon
evidence presented by the parties as to their contribution. In apportioning liability under
this subparagraph, the court may consider among other factors, the following:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous
waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous
waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local
officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
H.R. 7020 § 3071(a)(2)(B) (as amended), 126 CONG. REc. 26,781 (1980).
92. The amendment was passed by the House on September 23, 1980. 126 CONG. REC.
26,798-99 (1980).
93. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 126 CONG. Rrc. 30,908-09 (1980).
94. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Ses., 126 CONG. REc. 30,909 (1980).
95. S. 1480, § 4(i)(1)(A).
96. Id. The Senate's version provided in part:
(f)(1) In any case where a person held liable under this section can demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that (A) the contribution of such person to a discharge,
release, or disposal of a hazardous substance can be distinguished or apportioned and
(B) such contribution was not a significant factor in causing or contributing to the
discharge, release, or disposal or the damages resulting therefrom, the liability of such
person shall be limited to that portion of the release or damages to which such person
contributed.
S. 1480, § 4(f)(1), 126 CONG. REC. 30,908-09 (1980).
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was deleted by both houses to ensure passage of the bill.97 The final bill
contained no explicit reference to joint and several liability but instead adopted
the liability standard set forth in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)." The FWPCA is also silent with respect to joint and several
liability but has been interpreted to impose joint and several liability on
responsible parties. 99
In addition to the adoption of the FWPCA standard, Congress intended that
courts should look to common law principles to determine if joint and several
liability applies in CERCLA suits."° Senator Randolph explained during the
final debates on the Senate bill that "traditional and evolving principles of
common law" would govern issues of liability not resolved by the act.'
Therefore, the legislative history of CERCLA indicates that the imposition of
joint and several liability was contemplated but not mandated in the statute." 2
Instead, courts were instructed to look to both the FWPCA and the common law
when determining whether to impose joint and several liability. 3
B. The Common Law of Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA
The landmark case discussing joint and several liability in the CERCLA
context was United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp."4 In Chem-Dyne, the
government sued twenty-four of 289 alleged generators and transporters of

final amendment to the bill and eliminated the
97. On November 24, 1980, the Senate made its
terms strict liability and joint and several liability from its provisions. 126 CONG.REc. 30,932
(1980). Senator Randolph explained "we have deleted any reference to joint and several liability,
relying on common law principles to determine when parties should be severally liable." Id.
Subsequently, on December 3, 1980, the House stnck the language in its bill and substituted the
language of the Senate bill. 126 CONG. REC. 31,981 (1980).
98. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 CONG. REc. 30,972-82 (1980). Under CERCLA,
"liability" isconstrued as the standard of liability that obtains under § 1321 of the FWPCA. 42
U.S.C. 9601(32) (1983). Section 1321 of the FWPCA governs liability for discharges of oil and
hazardous substances into the navigable waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t) (1982).
99. See United States v. MN Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that § 1321(g)
of the FWPCA imposes joint and several liability on the owners and operators of vessels from which
oil has been discharged), reh 'g denied, 693 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132
(1983).
100. 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Senator Randolph).
101. Id. Senator Randolph went on to say that the liability of joint tortfeasors will be
determined under common or previous statutory law. Id.
102. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
104. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The court in Chem-Dyne was the first to decide
whether multiple defendants could be held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA. See Sokol,
supra note 87, at 886.
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hazardous waste for reimbursement of the EPA's cleanup costs' 0 5 The
government alleged that the express statutory language made clear that the
defendants were jointly and severally liable for the cleanup costs."re
The court found that the statutory language was ambiguous regarding the
scope of liability contemplated by Congress in CERCLA. 3 7 To determine
whether CERCLA required the imposition ofjoint and several liability, the court
reviewed the legislative history.'
From an examination of the legislative
history, the court held that common law principles" 9 should determine
whether parties are jointly and severally liable." ° The court stated that
liability could be apportioned when two or more persons acting independently
cause a single harm that has a reasonable basis for division."' The court
further stated that where two or more persons cause a single and indivisible
harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm."'
After Chem-Dyne, the federal courts arrived at inconsistent decisions
interpreting CERCLA's scope of liability." 3 In U.S. v. A & F Materials Co.,

105. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 804. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,
claiming they were not subject to joint and several liability. The court stated that the matter of scope
of liability under CERCLA was one of first impression to the court. Id.
106. Id. at 805. The court disagreed and held that the language contained in the statute was
ambiguous with regard to the scope of liability that courts should apply to responsible parties. Id.
107. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 805. In order to expedite discovery and trial preparation,
the defendants moved for an early determination that they were not jointly and severally liable for
the Chem-Dyne cleanup costs. Id. at 804.
108. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (citing
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1982)).
109. The court based its analysis on the Second Restatement of Tort's definition of joint and
several liability. Section 433A of the restatement provides that:
(1) Damages for harm are to apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single
harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A (1976).
110. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 805 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S14,969 (daily ed. Nov. 24,
1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph)).
111. Id. at 810. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 443A, 881 (1976)).
112. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 875 (1976)). In addition, the burden
of proof as to apportionment is on each defendant. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433B (1976)). The court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment because disputed material facts existed as to the divisibility of the harm. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811.
113. See Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (recognizing
that the burden for proving that the harm is divisible lies on the owners); but see Hastings Bldg.
Prod. Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp., No. 1:88-CV-619, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 644.3, at *20
(May 13, 1991) (noting that courts have the power to refuse to impose joint and several liability);
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the court rejected Chem-Dyne's rigid Restatement approach to joint and several
liability and adopted a more moderate approach." 4 The court concluded that
even if the defendant could not prove that the harm was divisible, equitable
factors" 5 could be applied in apportioning liability." 6 The court endorsed
the principles set forth in the Gore Amendment" 7 because, as the court stated,
a moderate approach promotes fairness and avoids the indiscriminate application
of joint and several liability."'
Unfortunately, division of harm is difficult, if not impossible, in some
cases. No defendant has ever successfully invoked a divisibility of harm defense
in any reported decision." 9 Many cases that impose joint and several liability
involve hazardous wastes sites where numerous substances have been
commingled. " Determining the contribution of each defendant often requires
a very complex assessment of the relative toxicity, the potential for
leaching,' 2 ' and the ability of the environment to safely absorb the wastes. 1 2
The First Circuit recognized the inherent difficulty in apportioning liability
for hazardous waste cleanup costs in O'Neil v. Picillo. "2 The O'Neil court
adopted the approach taken in Chem-Dyne and followed the Restatement method
of apportioning damages based on the divisibility of the harm.' 2' The court
noted, however, that the practical effect of placing the burden of proving
divisibility on the defendant has been that responsible parties rarely escape joint

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986)
(noting that most cases have imposed joint and several liability under CERCLA).
114. 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Il. 1984).
115. The court was referring to the Gore Amendment. The court reasoned that the moderate
approach to joint and several liability set out in the Gore Amendment was both persuasive and
consistent with Congress' intent. Id. at 1256.
116. Id.
117. Id. See supra note 91 and accompanying text for a description of the Gore Amendment.
118. Chem-Dyne, 578 F. Supp at 1257.
119. David MontgomeryMoore, The Divisibilityof HarmDefense to Joint and SeveralLiability
Under CERCL4, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,529 (1993). Moore argues that the divisibility of harm
defense is difficult to raise except in the clearest of cases. Id.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 1986).
121. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
122. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 n.26 (4th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with the
district court that evidence disclosing the relative toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic
capacity of the substances at the site would be relevant to establishing divisibility of harm).
123. 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
124. Id. at 178.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss3/8

Rochstein: Rethinking the Joint and Several Liability of Lenders Under CERCL

1995]

LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA

1433

and several liability."2u Further, the court stated that holding defendants
jointly and severally liable in such situations often results in defendants paying
far more than their fair share of the harm."2
The O'Neil court proceeded to address the right to bring a suit for
contribution when joint and several liability imposes a disproportionate burden
on some defendants.'" The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA) contained a statutory cause of action for contribution," 2
codifying what most courts had concluded was implicit in the 1980 Act."2
The contribution section of SARA authorized courts to allocate the costs of
hazardous waste cleanups using such equitable factors that the courts deem
appropriate. '" Unfortunately, the O'Neil court recognized that the right to
contribution does not help a defendant where other responsible parties are either
difficult to locate or insolvent. 3 ' Moreover, the court stated, there are
significant transaction costs involved in bringing other responsible parties to
court. 32 If it were possible to locate all responsible parties at a small cost,
the issue of joint and several liability would only be of marginal
significance. 33
'
The recognition of the O'Neil court that joint and several liability can be
especially inequitable when the other responsible parties are insolvent lies at the
center of the special problems lenders face. When the EPA sues a lender for

125. Id. at 178-79. Courts regularly find that where wastes of varying (and unknown) degrees
of toxicity and migratory potential commingle, it is impossible to determine the amount of
environmental harm caused by each. Id. at 179 (citing Uhem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811; Monsanto,
858 F.2d at 172-73).
126. Id. (citing Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173) (the court shared the appellants' concern that the
appellants not be held ultimately responsible for reimbursing more than their just proportion of the
government's response cost).
127. Id. at 179.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) provides in part: "Any person
may eek contribution from any other person who is liable .. .under section 9607(a) of this title
• .. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." Id.
129. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988).
131. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179. See B. Todd Wetzel, Note, Divisibility of Harm Under
CERCLA: Does an Indivisible Potential or Averted Harm Warrant the Imposition of Joint and
Several Liability?, 81 KY. L.J. 825 (1993). In O'Neil, the EPA argued that it is irrelevant whether
the costs of removal could be apportioned. O'Neil, 883, F.2d at 180. The court explained that the
reason the EPA took this position was not because the environmental harm that actually occurred
was indivisible, but because the additional environmental harm that the government averted would
have been indivisible had it occurred. Id. at 829. Wetzel argues that the O'Neil court's criticism
of the EPA's argument was warranted and was in fact incorrect. Id. at 831.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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CERCLA cleanup costs, the parties primarily responsible for the pollution often
do not have the funds to reimburse the EPA." The imposition of joint and
several liability can lead to inequitable results, even when the lender's role in
the contamination was minor and easy to identify. The following section will
discuss the common law evolution of lender liability in the United States. It will
then conclude that the main cause of the lender liability problem is CERCLA's
imposition of joint and several liability on lenders.
IV. REvIEw OF LENDER LiABILrrY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Lender LiabilityDefined
When transacting a loan, it is common practice for lending institutions to
take security for the loan.' 35 The most typical arrangements are the general
A general security
security agreement and the real estate mortgage."
property of the
personal
in
the
interest
a
security
for
provides
agreement
37
A mortgage,
obligations.'
the
loan
of
the
performance
borrower to secure
in title theory states, 3 ' forms a specific charge on the title of the borrower's
real estate, with the title vesting in the lender until the loan obligations are
met.' 39 Both agreements are often perceived by the government to bring

134. See David R. Berz & Peter M. Gillon, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of a
New Deep Pocket, 108 BANKING L.J. 4, 8 (1991) (noting that in the typical CERCLA case,
involving millions of dollars in cleanup costs, the parties actually responsible for the environmental
contamination are often unknown or are financially insolvent).
135. Scott G. Requadt, Lender on a Hot Tin Roof: The Developing Doctrine of LenderLiability
for Environmental Cleanup in Canada, 50 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 194, 197 (1992).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
139. Requadt, supra note 135, at 197. The crux of the problem is rooted in the metaphysics
of a real estate secured transaction. Whether the lender takes title, title remains legally in the
borrower, or title is transferred to a third party trustee, all secured parties have a right to foreclose
the mortgagor's interest in the security to pay off a defaulted loan. Marzulla & Kappel, supra note
4, at 711. Whether the property is located in a "lien theory" or "title theory" state, the result of
the foreclosure is the same. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
This holds true unless a third party overbids the amount of the loan (plus allowable fees and costs),
otherwise the lender takes title to the property. Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 4, at 711.
The nature of a security interest in property during the term of the mortgage is treated
differently by different states. Under the "title theory," the lender holds title to the property until
the entire mortgage debt has been paid off, at which point the title passes to the borrower. Marzulla
& Kappel, supra note 4, at 711.
The majority of states, however, follow the "lien theory," which holds that during the term
of the mortgage, the lender merely has a first priority lien on the secured property. Id. Under the
"lien theory," the borrower holds title to the property at all times. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, ET
AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 1.5, 4.1, 4.2 (1979).
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lenders within the definition of an owner or operator under CERCLA. "
Lenders often take an active role in the management of facilities to which
they have loaned money.' 4 Such involvement, coupled with technical owner
or operator status, could potentially lead to liability for claims filed against the
property. Courts have shown a willingness to impose liability where the
lender's activities are managerial in nature.' 42 The result is that lenders are
often held liable for the entire cleanup cost born by the EPA since liability is
strict and joint and several. 4 3 The following case discussions will show how
the government has brought lenders into the liability scheme of CERCLA. The
cases will exemplify how the deep pocket lenders were attractive targets to the
government when the polluting borrowers were insolvent.
B. Judicial Treatment of the Security Interest Exemption
While congressional intent when passing CERCLA makes plain that secured
creditors are exempt from some degree of CERCLA liability, the scope of the
exemption is not clear."'* Courts have looked to the legislative history but
have been unable to find guidance. '" As a result, courts have made
inconsistent determinations about the scope of the exemption and their tendency
to apply narrow interpretations has caused alarm in the lending community."
This Note will discuss six federal court cases that have dealt with the
security interest exemption since 1985. 41 In the earlier cases, the courts
focused on two requisite factors to apply the security interest exemption. First,

140. Requadt, supra note 135, at 198.
141. Lenders must deal with foreclosures, secured creditor contracts with the borrower, lenderborrower work-outs, pre-loan evaluations, and claims by private parties and state governments.
Charles F. Lettow, Five QuestionsMay Hold Key to Ultimate Superfund Liability, BANKING POL'Y
REP., May 20, 1991, at 1.

142. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1 th Cir. 1990); In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990).
143. Jimmy Y. Levy, Landlord and LenderLiabilityfor Hazardous Waste Clean-up: A Review
of the Evolving Canadianand American Case Law, 20 CAN. Bus. L.J. 269, 293 (1992).
144. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
146. Kublicki, supra note 4, at 515. Most affected by the decision are banks. Id. Kublicki
argues that Fleet Factors transforms banks into involuntary sureties for polluting businesses. Id.
Under Fleet Factors, banks, as liable lenders, must foot the bill for businesses that have dumped

waste on their own premises. Id. Certain banks are so small that a single environmental cleanup
would wipe them out. Id.
147. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1 th Cir. 1990); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp.
556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envti. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In
re T.P. Long Chem., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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the extent of the lender's involvement in the management of the facility was
determined." 4 Second, the courts determined whether the lender stood to be
unjustly enriched because of the cleanup of the facility by the EPA. 49
However, in the more recent cases, the courts have focused on a third issue:
the extent to which a lender could exercise managerial control over the
borrower's day-to-day operations." 5 Both actual involvement and the lender's
potential to become involved were determinative."' The following discussion
will address the early interpretations of the security interest exemption followed
by an examination of the more recent cases that prompted the EPA to issue its
own interpretation.
C. Early Interpretationsof the Security Interest Exemption
Whether a lender could be held liable under CERCLA as an operator of a
facility was addressed by a bankruptcy court in Ohio, in In re T.P. Long
Chemical, Inc.' The lender, BancOhio National Bank held a security interest
in the property of T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., a company that ran a rubber
recycling plant where the EPA conducted a Superfund cleanup.' 53 The EPA
alleged that BancOhio was liable for the EPA's cleanup costs because the
obligations of the borrower extended to the lender as an owner or operator. 1"4
However, the court rejected the EPA's argument. 55 The court held that the
only possible indicia of ownership attributable to BancOhio was its activities
concerning the protection of its security interest. 156 BancOhio was found not
to have participated in the management of the facility and, as a result, was
entitled to the security interest exemption contained in CERCLA's definition of
owner or operator.'57
The issue of lender liability next surfaced in United States v. Mirabile.sa

148. See Levy, supra note 143, at 293.
149. See id.
150. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557; Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 672.
151. Id.
152. 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
153. Id. at 280. T.P. Long filed for bankruptcy reorganization and a trustee was appointed to
administer the estate. Id. BancOhio held a security interest in the accounts receivable, equipment,
fixtures, and inventory. Id.
154. Id. at 288.
155. Id. The court reasoned that a creditor assumes a financial risk when it takes a security
interest in collateral. Id. The creditor always bears the inherent risk that the value of the collateral
will be insufficient to protect it in the case of default by the borrower. Id. The court went on to
say that it would not add to this risk by making the creditor the insurer of all risks caused by its
collateral. Id.

156. Id. at 289.
157. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 289 (Bankr. W.D. Ohio 1985).
158. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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In Mirabile, the EPA sued the Mirabiles as the owners of property containing
hazardous waste caused by a previous owner, Turco Coatings, Inc., for the costs
incurred in the cleanup of the property.5 9 Three former creditors of Turco
were joined as third party defendants: American Bank and Trust Company
(ABT), Mellon Bank National Association (Mellon), and the Small Business
1
Administration (SBA). W
In 1980, Turco filed a petition for bankruptcy that the bankruptcy court
dismissed in 1981.'
The dismissal enabled ABT to proceed to foreclose on
the property because it was the highest bidder at the sheriffs sale. 62 Despite
this involvement, the court found that ABT had never become so "overly
entangled" in Turco's activities that it lost the benefit of the security interest
exemption. 3 According to the court, ABT's involvement had been limited
to the general financial aspects of management.'" The court stated that before
it could hold a secured creditor liable under CERCLA, the secured creditor
.must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the
site."" 6 For these reasons, the court granted summary judgment to ABT.' 6
The court also found that SBA's conduct was insufficient to bring it within
the scope of CERCLA liability.'67 The court found that SBA had merely
participated in the financial aspects of the operation t " even though there was
a clause in the loan agreement, as required by SBA regulations, indicating that
SBA must provide management assistance to its borrowers. No evidence existed

159. Id. at 20,995.
160. Id. The Mirabiles joined ABT and Mellon, who counterclaimed against the United States,
relying on the alleged involvement of the SBA in creating the conditions at the site. Id.
161. Id. at 20,996.
162. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,995 (Envtl. L. Inst.)(E.D. Pa.
1985).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The court reasoned that the imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending
institutions would enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs given the fact
that owners and operators of hazardous waste dump sites are often elusive, defunct, or otherwise
judgment proof. Id. It may well be that the imposition of such liability would help to ensure more
responsible management of hazardous waste sites. Id. The consideration of such policy matters,
and the decision as to imposition of liability, however, lies with Congress. Id. In enacting
CERCLA, Congress singled out secured creditors for protection from liability under certain
circumstances. Id.
166. Id.
167. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,997 (Envtl. L. Inst.)(E.D. Pa.
1985).
168. Id. In fact, the court stated that SBA's case for summary judgment was stronger than
ABT's. Id.
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Therefore, the court granted

However, the court denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment.''
The court was not satisfied that Mellon's involvement brought it within the
security interest exemption. 72 Witnesses testified that the bank had become
heavily involved in the day-to-day operations of Turco and may have asserted
some control over manufacturing, personnel, and supply decisions. 73 The
court believed that such activities created a genuine issue of material fact and
precluded summary judgment. 74
The security interest exemption was read more narrowly in United States
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 75 The court in Maryland Bank sought to
determine whether it could hold a bank liable for CERCLA reimbursement
costs. 76 Maryland Bank held a mortgage on the California Maryland Drum
Site"7 which was used to conduct a trash and garbage business."T After the
owner defaulted on the loans, Maryland Bank foreclosed and purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale." 9 Four years after Maryland Bank's purchase
of the property, the EPA found toxic waste at the site, removed it, and then
sued the bank for the cleanup costs."
The bank argued that it was entitled

169. Id.

In addition, the court dismissed the argument that placing restrictions in a loan

agreement, without more, constitutes participation in management sufficient to lose the protection
of the security interest exemption. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 20,097.
172. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,097 (Envtl. L. Inst.)(E.D. Pa.
1985). However, the court stated that the liability Mirabile sought to impose on Mellon was based
on a weak foundation. Id. Nonetheless, given that all doubts were to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment, the court held that genuine issues of material fact
existed. Id.
173. Id. The court acknowledged that while such involvement would not normally lead to
CERCLA liability, it would be helpful to have a clearer picture of Mellon's involvement before a
decision was made. Id.
174. Id.
175. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
176. Id. at 574.
177. The piece of property subject to litigation was a 117 acre farm located near the town of

California, Maryland, in St. Mary's County. Id. at 575. The parties dubbed the property the
California Maryland Drum site. Id.
178. Id.
179. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Md. 1986).
180. Id. at 575-76. The EPA actually notified the president of Maryland Bank that it would
give Maryland Bank an opportunity to initiate corrective action at the site. Id. at 575. The bank
declined the EPA's offer so the agency proceeded to clean up the site itself, removing 237 drums
of chemical material and 1180 tons of contaminated soil at a cost of approximately $551,713. Id.
at 575-76.
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to the security interest exemption."" The court held, however, that because
the bank held the property after the purchase at the foreclosure sale for
investment purposes, it was no longer entitled to the security interest
exemption."
The court stated that the exclusion did not apply to former
mortgagees currently holding title after purchasing the property at the
foreclosure sale when the former mortgagee held title for nearly four years, and
it was nearly one year before the EPA cleanup."
The next important case concerning lender liability was Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating & Manufacturing Co."8 ' The residents of a Pennsylvania
borough sued BFG, alleging that BFG was liable for personal injuries caused by
unlawful contamination of the environment as well as the cleanup costs under
CERCLA.1 u In response, BFG filed a third party complaint against the
National Bank of the Commonwealth (National Bank) for indemnification and
contribution.is National Bank filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
that it was not a past owner or operator and therefore, not liable under
CERCLA." 7

In 1975, National Bank made a loan to Berlin Metal Polishers (Berlin) that
was secured by a mortgage on the property."
In 1980, Berlin defaulted on
its obligation to the bank.'" A year later, in February of 1981, the facility

was shut down and National Bank foreclosed on the Berlin loan."l
Subsequent to the foreclosure, Berlin leased the property in August 1981, to
Season-All, a window manufacturer. ''

Initially Season-All paid rent to

Berlin, but National Bank soon intervened in this arrangement and instructed
Season-All to submit all payments to the bank."r

In April of 1982, National

181. Id. at 579. The bank contended that it was entitled to the benefit of this exclusion because
it acquired ownership of the dump site through the foreclosure on its security interest and the
purchase of the land at the foreclosure sale. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 579. The court stated that the verb tense of the exemption is critical. Id. The
security interest must exist at the time of the cleanup. Id. The security interest in the form of a
mortgage terminated at the foreclosure sale at which time it ripened into full ownership. Id.
184. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
185. Id. at 557.
186. Id. National Bank was an eight-month record title owner of the property in question. Id.
187. Id. at 561.
188. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 558 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
189. Id. In January of that year, National Bank representatives toured the facility, met with
Berlin management, and tried to arrange for a new loan guaranteed by the Small Business.
Administration. Id.
190. Id. at 559.
191. Id. Season-All used the property to store raw materials for its window manufacturing
operation. Id.
192. Id. at 560.
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Bank purchased the property at a sheriff's foreclosure sale and took delivery of
the property on May 14, 1982."9 In April of 1982, Season-All, at the request
of National Bank, arranged for the removal of drums containing toxic waste
from the site."9
The court considered two time frames to determine whether National Bank
was an "owner or operator" of the property."e The time frames were the preand post-foreclosure periods. " The court held that the pre-foreclosure steps
National Bank took to protect its loan were entitled to the security interest
exemption. "'
As to National Bank's post-foreclosure purchase of the
property, the court held that the security interest exemption did not apply.'
The court reasoned that when a lender is the successful purchaser at a
foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable to the same extent as any other
bidder at the sale would have been." 9 Therefore, the court denied National
Bank's motion for summary judgment. O
In sum, Guidice strengthened the view advanced in Mirabile that lenders
can involve themselves in their borrowers' financial decisions without risking
CERCLA liability .'
Such an interpretation seems consistent with the
language contained in the security interest exemption.'
Nonetheless,
Maryland Bank cast considerable doubt on whether banks can foreclose on a

193. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 559 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
194. Id. at 560.
195. Id.at 561.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 562. After Berlin defaulted on its loan obligations, the bank took steps to protect
its security interest in the Berlin Property. Id. These steps included a meeting with Berlin officials
where the bank was informed of such things as the status of the Berlin accounts, personnel changes,
and the presence of raw materials. Id. The court regarded these actions as prudent measures
undertaken to protect the bank's security interest in the property. Id.
198. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
The court focused on the decisions in Maryland Bank and Mirabile. Id. The court noted the
divergence in outcomes of the two cases and was ultimately persuaded by the reasoning in Maryland
Bank that an exemption for landowning lenders would create a special class of otherwise liable
landowners. Id. In other words, the security interest exemption should only apply to lenders when
they hold tide to the property as secured creditors. Id. Otherwise, if the lender becomes the
beneficial owner of the property, then the security interest exemption should not apply. Id. Once
a lender purchases the property at the foreclosure sale, then the lender no longer holds the property
as security for their loan. Id. But see the foreclosure provisions in the EPA's interpretation of the
security interest exemption, infra notes 275-97 and accompanying text.
199. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
200. Id. at 561. The court concluded that National Bank was aware that drums containing
hazardous materials were on the Berlin Property during its ownership. Id. at 564.
201. Scan P. Madden, Note, Will the CERCLA Be Unbroken? Repairing the Damage After
Fleet Factors, 59 FORDHAM L. Rav. 135, 144 (1990).
202. Id. at 144.
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3
facility without exposing themselves to potential CERCLA liability.2
Further, Guidice precludes banks from purchasing property at a foreclosure sale
without incurring CERCLA liability.'
The theme that came from the early
interpretations of the security interest exemption, however, was that actual
participation in management can lead to CERCLA liability for lenders.

D. Recent Conflicting Interpretationsof the Security Interest Exemption
The most controversial case regarding the security interest exemption is the
1990 decision of United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 5 The Eleventh Circuit
applied a surprisingly narrow interpretation of the security interest exemption.
Prior to Fleet Factors, no federal court had clearly defined the degree of
participation required for a lender to incur CERCLA liability."
In Fleet Factors, Swainsboro Print Works (SWP) operated a cloth-printing
facility from 1963 until it ceased operations in 1981.1 °7 SWP and Fleet
Factors entered into an agreement in 1976, whereby Fleet lent money to SWP
and SWP assigned its accounts receivables to Fleet as collateral for the
loans.'
Fleet also took a security interest in SWP's property, plant,
equipment, fixtures, and inventory."
In December 1981, SWP filed for
bankruptcy 210 and in May of 1982, Fleet foreclosed on its security interest in
inventory and equipment but did not foreclose on its security interest in the plant
or real property. 2" ' In June of 1982, Fleet contracted to have the equipment
auctioned off and finally in 1983, Fleet arranged for the removal of all unsold
equipment."' Fleet had no involvement in the facility after December of

203. Id. at 142.
204. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
205. 901 F.2d 1550 (1 th Cir. 1990). See generally Note, Cleaning Up the DebrisAfter Fleet
Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1249
(1991); Michael B. Kupin, New Alterations of the Lender LiabilityLandscape: CERCLA After the
Fleet Factors Decision, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 191 (1991); Madden, supra note 201, at 158-59.
206. Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 4, at 32.
207. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1552.
208. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D. Ga. 1988). SWP and
Fleet entered into a factoring agreement. Id. Factoring is a "type of service whereby a firm sells
or transfers title to its accounts receivable to a factoring company, which then acts as principal, not
as agent. The receivables are sold without-recourse, meaning the factor cannot turn to the seller in
the event accounts prove uncollectible. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 122 (1985).
209. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957.
210. Id. at 958. SWP originally filed under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code but
subsequently converted the case to a chapter 7 liquidation. Id.
211. Id. at 957.
212. Id. at 958.
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1983.23 The EPA inspected the site in January of 1984 and discovered 700
drums of hazardous substances. 1 4 The EPA removed the drums and then
sought recovery from the responsible parties. 25" Fleet was included in the
action as a potentially responsible party.2" 6 Both the government and Fleet
moved for summary judgment.2 7
The Court of Appeals held that a secured creditor could incur liability under
§ 9607(a)(2) of CERCLA without being an operator,
by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to
actually involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in
order to be liable.... Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its
involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad
to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal
2
decisions if it so chose. 18
The court rationalized that in order to achieve the remedial goals of CERCLA,
ambiguous statutory terms such as "owner" or "operator" should be construed

213. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990).
214. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
215. Id. Title was eventually passed to the county, but the EPA could not bring an action
against the county because SARA amended CERCLA to exempt from liability states and their
political subdivisions that acquire title to contaminated property pursuant to foreclosure for nonpayment of taxes. Id. at 959-60; 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1988).
216. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957.
217. Id. The district court interpreted the phrases "participating in the management of a
facility" and "primarily to protect the security interest" to permit secured creditors to provide
financial assistance and general instances of specific management advice to debtors. Id. at 960
(citing United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,994, 20,995 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (E.D. Pa.
1985)). According to the district court, the debtor would not risk CERCLA liability if it did not
participate in the day-to-day management of the business or facility. FleetFactors, 724 F. Supp at
960. The district court applied this standard to the time that SWP initially became involved with
the facility in 1976 until Fleet's representative auctioned off the foreclosed equipment in 1982. Id.
The district court concluded that Fleet's activities at the facility did not rise to the level of
participation in management sufficient to impose CERCLA liability. Id. The district court went on
to find, however, that disputed material facts existed with respect to the time period from the auction
until Fleet ceased contact with the SWP facility and thereby denied part of Fleet's motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 961. The trial judge authorized an interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals because of uncertainties about the definition of "owner and operator" and
the security interest exemption. Id. at 962.
218. United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1555, 1557-58 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (emphasis
added). The court stated that the terms "operator" and "participation in management" encompassed
different levels of activity, a construction it said was necessary to give meaning to the "participating
in management" language. Id.
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in favor of finding liability in order to reimburse the government's
expenditures." 9 In the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit, its decision would
encourage lenders to engage in complete pre-loan investigations of prospective
borrowers to make sure that any environmental risk is discovered.'
Further,
the decision would also encourage creditors to monitor the environmental
policies and practices of borrowers to ensure responsible disposal of hazardous
wastes. 221
The term "capacity to influence," however, was a very broad
characterization of the degree of participation in management necessary to incur
liability.'
Lenders believed that almost any secured creditor could
theoretically be held liable under this construction of the exemption.'
Critics
of the decision argued that such a broad reading of "participation in
management" would not result in the benefits2' contemplated by the
court.'m Others argued that such a broad interpretation would actually make

219. Id. at 1557. In order to achieve the remedial goal of the CERCLA statutory scheme,
ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability for the costs incurred by the
government in responding to the hazards at such facilities. Id. (citing Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
220. Id. at 1558-59.
221. Id. at 1558.
222. Neal B. Glick & Kevin L. Nulton, Lender Liability Under the Superfund Statute, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., July 22, 1991, at 37.
The decision immediately reverberated through at the lending community. The
implication of the decision was that any significant involvement in day-to-day operations
would result in liability, even if it was merely to protect the lender's security interest.
Further, any involvement with management could trigger liability if the lender had the
power to influence hazardous waste disposal decisions. This could mean that liability
might be triggered by the language in loan documents allowing lenders to make
decisions concerning hazardous waste disposal activities.
Id.
223. See, e.g., Lettow, supra note 141, at 1.
224. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
225. See generally Madden, supra note 201, at 148-51. Critics have argued that the narrow
interpretation of the security interest exemption by the court in Fleet Factors impinges on other
policy considerations, particularly those involving small business and banking. Id. at 158. The risks
of lending to environmentally sensitive small businesses are open-ended, and under the Fleet Factors
analysis, virtually unquantifiable. Id. If banks cannot measure the risk of lending to borrowers in
environmentally sensitive businesses, they will not extend credit to these borrowers. Id. at 158-59.
There are essentially two components to a bank's analysis of a borrower's appropriate loan
rate premium. See Mark J. Flannery, A Portfolio View of Loan Selection and Pricing, in
HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY 457, 459-60 (R. Aspinwall & R. Eisenbeis eds. 1985). First,
the default premium accounts for the lender's expected loss on the loan, that is generally computed
with reference to the type of borrower's default rate. Id. For example, if the assessed probability
of default is two percent, the lender would charge approximately two percent above the pure time
value of money. Id. at 460. Second, the bank computes a risk premium that "compensates the
lender for uncertainty about how much of the loan will be repaid." Id. (emphasis in original). Both
components are affected by the open-ended nature of environmental liability. Id.
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lenders fearful that any direct involvement in the borrower's activities, especially
hazardous waste policies, could result in the loss of the security interest
exemption.'
Consequently, some commentators have suggested that the Fleet
Factors decision would make lenders7 less likely to investigate or monitor a
borrower's environmental practices.
Lenders did receive some relief, though, from a Ninth Circuit decision
three months after the Eleventh circuit's decision in Fleet Factors. In Hill v.
East Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.)," Bergsoe Metals Corporation
In
(Bergsoe) operated a lead recycling business in St. Helens, Oregon.'
December of 1978, the Port of St. Helens (Port) agreed to issue industrial
development revenue bonds and pollution control bonds for Bergsoe.'
Bergsoe and the Port entered into a sale-lease back of the property with Bergsoe
and agreed to build the plant and pay its lease payments to the United States
National Bank of Oregon (Bank) as trustee of the Port-issued industrial revenue
bonds."3 In the words of the Ninth Circuit, the Port, on the one hand, held
the "paper title" to the property on which the plant was constructed. 2
Bergsoe, on the other hand, had all other traditional indicia of ownership "such
as responsibility for the payment of taxes and for the purchase of
insurance. 23
Bergsoe began to operate the newly constructed plant in 1982.Y24 Shortly
thereafter, Bergsoe began experiencing financial difficulty, and by 1983, was in

226. See generally Madden, supra note 201, at 155-59.
227. See McGaughan, supra note 15, at 103-04.
228. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
229. Id. at 669.
230. Id. An industrial development revenue bond (IDB) is defined as follows:
A bond issued by a state or local government to finance plants and facilities that are then
leased to private business. The purpose of IDBs is to aUract industry as part of local
economic development efforts. The appeal to investors is that they are tax-exempt..
. . Properties financed by IDBs are nominally owned by the issuing government, but
the bonds are the credit responsibility of the firms that lease the facilities.
J. DOWNES & J. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 180 (1985).

231. In re Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 670.
232. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Comp., Ltd., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir.
1990). The Bergsoe court made plain that the Port was the owner of the facility in name only:
Bergsoe's "rent" was equal to the principal and interest due under the bonds. The
money was to be paid directly to the Bank as trustee for the bondholders. The leases
expired not on a specific date, but when the money owed under the bonds was paid off.
Further, when the bonds were paid off, Bergsoe could purchase full title to the property
for the nominal sum of $100.
Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 670.
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default on its leases.'
The Port, Bergsoe, and the bondholders' trustee
subsequently agreed to an arrangement whereby a third party would manage the
facility.'
Nonetheless, the facility continued to perform poorly and in
October of 1986, Bergsoe was placed in involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings. 7
Subsequently, Bergsoe was sued because of the release of hazardous waste
materials at the site.'
Bergsoe's shareholders filed a counterclaim, including
a third party complaint against the Port seeking indemnification, alleging that the
Port and the Bank were liable for the CERCLA cleanup costs. 9 The Ninth
Circuit followed the lower court's decision and held that the Port was entitled
to the security interest exemption and not liable for CERCLA cleanup costs.'
The appellate court concluded that the Port held title to the property primarily
to ensure repayment of the bonds and had insufficient participation in the
management of the plant to lose the exemption."' Most compelling in the
decision was the court's statement in a footnote that "a creditor must . . .
exercise actual management authority before it can be held liable for action or
inaction which results in the discharge of hazardous wastes. Merely having the
power to get involved in management, but failing to exercise it, is not
enough."'
Such language undermined the broad inclusion of liable parties
23
the Fleet Factors decision.
in
announced

235. In re Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 670.
236. Id.
237. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Comp., Ltd., 910 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir.
1990). A company's creditors may force it into bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)
(1988) (discussing involuntary bankruptcy).
238. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 670.
239. Id. The Port moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not an owner for
the purposes of establishing liability under CERCLA. Id.There was no district court opinion. The
bankruptcy court made certain findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the motions that
were accepted by the district court that granted the summary judgment motion. See Hill v. East
Asiatic Co. (In re Blrgsoe Metal), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEms 12188 (granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment).
240. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 673. The court analyzed both the Port's ownership and the extent
of its participation in the management of the facility. Id. The court concluded that no material
issues of fact existed as to either. Id.
241. In re Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 670-71.
242. In re Bergsoe Metal.Corp. v. East Asiatic Comp., Ld., 910 F.2d 668, 673 n.3 (9th Cir.
1990). The court stated that the critical point was not what rights the Port had, but what it did. Id.
at 672. A secured creditor will always have some input at the planning stages of large-scale
projects. Id. If this were management, no secured creditor would ever be protected. Id.
243. Several commentators have construed the two cases; some have tried to reconcile the two
decisions, and others have argued that Bergsoe and Fleei Factorsare completely at odds. See, eg.,
Berz & Gillon, supra note 134, at 8 ("Although the decision purported to agree with Fleet Factors,
the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the 'capacity to control' test."); Freeman, Recent Case Law
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The CERCLA cases discussed above did not consider the implication of
joint and several liability on those lenders found liable for the reimbursement of
the EPA's cleanup costs. This Note posits that the lenders were joined in these
cases because the polluting defendants were insolvent,' and the lenders were
viewed as potential deep pockets. In Mirabile, for example, the court denied
summary judgment to one lender because evidence was introduced that the
lender had asserted some control over manufacturing, personnel, and supply
decisions.'
In Guidice, the court found that because National Bank held title
for a mere eight months after foreclosure, the bank was liable under
CERCLA. 2 In Maryland Bank, however, the bank purchased the property
at the foreclosure sale and was properly considered an owner of the property to
which it held title for nearly four years. " Mirabile and Guidice illustrate
how minimal involvement in the borrower's facility could lead to inequitable
results when joint and several liability is applied. Such a threat is unnecessary,
and Congress or the EPA should address the threat of inequitable results by
adopting a new liability scheme applicable to lenders who fail to qualify for the
security interest exemption.
In addition, the varying interpretations of the scope of the security interest
exemption provide evidence of the uncertainty in the judicial community with
regard to CERCLA liability.'
The key terms lack definition, and neither
federal case law nor legislative history provide insight into CERCLA's intended
scope of liability for lenders. In response, the EPA issued a rule providing its
own interpretation of CERCLA's security interest exemption. 29

May Expand Lenders' Risks Under Superfund, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 18 (stating that
Bergsoe rejected the Fleet Factors standard, at least in its most extreme form); Stephen Kleege,
Banks Welcome Court Ruling on Liability for Environmental Cleanups, AM. BANKER, Aug. 22,
1990, at 30 (stating that the Bergsoe Metal decision "implicitly rejects" Fleet Factors). But see
Clyde Mitchell, Liability Under CERCLA for Indenture Trustees, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1990, at 3
("Bergsoe Metals [sic] appears to reinforce and perhaps clarify the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Fleet Factors.").
244. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 670 (Bergsoe went into involuntary bankruptcy); United States v.
Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990) (the borrower filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy);
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 559 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (the borrower
defaulted on the loan so the bank foreclosed); United States v. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573,
575 (D. Md. 1986) (the borrower failed to make payments on the loan so the bank instituted a
foreclosure action); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,996 (Envtl. L. Inst.)
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (the borrower filed a petition for bankruptcy); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45
B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (the borrower filed for reorganization under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code).
245. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
246. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 663.
247. MarylandBank, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
248. See supra notes 144-247 and accompanying text.
249. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1994).
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V. THE EPA's LENDER LIABILrrY RULE

A. The Rule
On April 29, 1992, the EPA issued a final rule on lender liability under
0
CERCLA.2
The purpose of the rule was to clarify the range of activities for
secured lenders that will not result in liability under CERCLA for response costs
incurred by the EPA at borrowers' facilities.-" Under the security interest
exemption of CERCLA, if the lender holds "indicia of ownership" in a
contaminated facility primarily to protect its security interest and does not
"participate in the management" of the facility, the lender is not subject to

250. After the Fleet Factors decision, severe criticism from the lending community and the
ambiguity created by the decision prompted the EPA to prepare a set of draft roles to clarify the set
of actions a lender could take without exceeding the security interest exemption. See Nicholson &
Zuiderhoek, supra note 4, at 38. A first draft of the proposal to clarify the security interest
exemption was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in September 1990. EPA Draft
Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA, 21
ENv'T RPTR. (BNA) No. 24, at 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990). Under this first draft, lenders were required
to conduct a pre-loan environmental inspection or audit to qualify for the exemption. Id. at 1164.
The lender could also take certain actions such as restructuring or extending the loan, requiring
additional interest, or giving financial or operational advice to secure or protect its collateral from
loss. Id. Acquisition at a foreclosure sale was considered to be an action within the scope of the
exemption, an act necessary to protect the security interest. Id. However, if the lender did not
divest itself of the property within six months, it would have the burden of proving that it was
holding the property primarily to protect its security interest. Id. at 1165.
A second proposed draft was issued on January 24, 1991. Proposed Draft Rule on Lender
Liability Under CERCLA With Accompanying Letter From EPA to OMB,21 ENV'T RPTR. (BNA)
No. 43, at 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991). The most significant change in this draft removed the requirement
that lenders must have a pre-loan environmental assessment conducted to qualify for the exemption.
Id. at 1911-12, 1915. The second draft stated that an inspection was not necessary in every case
but that such an inspection would be considered probative of conduct consistent with the exemption.
Id. at 1912, 1915.
A third draft, issued June 24, 1991, modified the previous drafts by stating that the security
holder must take steps to sell the contaminated property within 12 months, instead of six months,
after foreclosure. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (d)(2)(i) (1994). So long as the lender did not refuse a
"bona fide" pVrchase offer more than six months after foreclosure, there was no time limit on how
long the lender could hold the property. Id. § 300.1100 (d)(2)(ii)(B). Lenders would need to
attempt to sell the property by listing and advertising it before the twelfth month after foreclosure.
Id. § 300.1100 (d)(2)(i).
In addition, the third draft stated that any party implicating a secured creditor in cleanup cost
liability had the burden of proving that the secured creditor exemption was not applicable. Id. §
300.1100. This provision was designed to reduce third party accusations of CERCLA liability to
those where there was clear proof of lender liability. See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 4,
at 45.
251. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100, 300.1105 (1994). The rule also interpreted CERCLA's
statutory requirements that address involuntary acquisition of contaminated facilities by certain
government entities and addressed comments received on the proposed versions. Id. § 300.1105.
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CERCLA liability. 2"
Confusion over the scope of the security interest
exemption led the EPA to promulgate its own interpretation of the amount of
protection that the exemption should afford lenders. 3
The rule attempted to clarify CERCLA's security interest exemption by
defining each of the important terms in the exemption. The rule would have the
effect of overriding the Fleet Factors decision despite the insistence of the
EPA that the rule was consistent with Fleet Factors.uss In addition, the rule
explicitly stated that several of the activities that lenders commonly undertake
are within the security interest exemption. The rule defined the meanings of
"indicia of ownership,"2% "primarily to protect a security interest," 5 7 and
"participation in the management"'
of a facility.'
Finally, the rule
described what lenders could do to protect their exempt status after they have
foreclosed on contaminated property.'

252. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. V. 1993).
253. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1994).
254. But see 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,369 (1992). The EPA, in its final rule, did not
specifically override the Fleet Factors decision. The language of the preamble, however, suggests
that the standard followed by the Bergsoe court more accurately reflected the intent behind the
security interest exemption. Id. The EPA went on to say that because the holder in Bergsoe was
not in any way involved in the facility's operations, the Ninth Circuit did not address the question
left unanswered in Fleet: the extent to which a holder may act to oversee and manage its security
interest without being considered to be participating in the facility's management. Id.
255. See id. at 18,369. The EPA stated that the view that the new lender liability rule overrules
or repudiates Fleet Factors is based on the mistaken assumption that the Eleventh Circuit held that
a lender is liable merely because it has the power or right to influence facility operations, even if
those rights are never exercised. Id. The EPA said that this characterization is inaccurate because
the Fleet Factors decision held that some actual involvement by a holder is a necessary precedent
to voiding the exemption. Id. The majority of commentators, however, disagree with this
proposition. See supra note 243.
256. The first definition provided by the rule was a broad and inclusive one for the term
"indicia of ownership." The EPA defined indicia of ownership as "evidence of a security interest,
evidence of an interest in a security interest, or evidence of an interest in real or personal property
securing a loan or other obligation, including any legal or equitable title to real or personal property
acquired incident to foreclosure and its equivalents." 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1994). The
definition includes title to property acquired through foreclosure. Id. The inclusion of foreclosure
as an act consistent with a holder's effort to protect a security interest was a departure from the
Maryland Bank and Guidice decision that stated that post-foreclosure ownership would be
participation in management. See Lavalette, supra note 4, at 489.
257. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b) (1994). Underthis definition, "the holder's indicia of ownership
are held primarily for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation." Id.
Excluded from the definition was any indicia of ownership "held primarily for investment purposes."
Id. § 300.1100(b)(2).
258. See infra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
259. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,346 (1992). The definitions did not, however, attempt to
define all possible activities that a lender could undertake consistent with the exemption. Id.
260. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d) (1994).
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The most important section of the EPA rule was the explanation of what
The rule stated that courts
constitutes "participation in management."" 6
should not consider the several actions lenders commonly take before making
loans when determining if lenders participated in the management of a
borrower's facility. These actions include: consultation and negotiations
concerning the structure and terms of the loan;' negotiations concerning the
interest rate;20 negotiations concerning the payment period;2' and specific
or general financial or other advice, suggestions, counseling or guidance. 2'
In addition, the rule stated that it was acceptable, although in no way required,
for a lender to undertake or require an environmental inspection of a borrower's
facility, or to require that the borrower clean up its facility before the lender
makes the loan or as a condition to making the loan. 2'
Once a loan has been made, the rule allowed a lender to engage in several
types of activities without losing its security interest exemption. Permissible
activities included: policing the loan; 267 undertaking a financial workout with
the borrower if the loan was in default or in threat of default; 2' and
monitoring the borrower's business. 2' In addition, the lender could require
or conduct on-site inspections and audits of the environmental and financial
condition of the borrower's facility.'

261. See id. § 300.1100(c).
262. Id. § 300.1100(c)(2)(i).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(B) (1994).
266. Id. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(i). This section provided in part:
A prospective holder who undertakes or requires an environmental inspection of the
vessel or facility in which indicia of ownership are to be held, or requires a prospective
borrower to clean up a vessel or facility or to comply or come into compliance... with
any applicable law or regulation, isnot by such action considered to be participating in
the vessel or facility's management. Neither the statute nor this regulation requires a
holder to conduct or require an inspection to qualify for the exemption, and the liability
of a holder cannot be based on qr affected by the holder not conducting or not requiring
an inspection.
Id.
267. Id. The EPA included a section to protect lenders that police their loans because the EPA
believed that liability could not be premised on the existence of loan covenants that seek to ensure
that the facility is operated in an environmentally sound manner. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,356 (1992).
268. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)(B)(1994). A lender could undertake financial work-out
activities regardless of whether the borrower was in default. Id. The lender's actual conduct, rather
than the lender's motivation, was critical. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,256 (1992) (citing In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp. v. East Asiatic Comp., Ltd., 910 F.2d 668, 672 n.2).
269. 40 C.F.R. § 300.4400(c)(2)(ii)(A)(1994).
270. Id.
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Under the rule's general test for participation in management,"' a lender
would lose its security interest exemption before foreclosure if it exercised
decisionmaking control over the borrower's environmental compliance in such
a way that the lender undertook responsibility for the borrower's hazardous
substance handling or disposal practices.' m In addition, the lender would lose
the exemption if it exercised control at a level comparable to that of a manager
of the borrower's facility such that the lender assumed a level of control
encompassing the day-to-day decisionmaking of the enterprise even if such
decisions were not limited to environmental matters. 27 4
The rule made it clear that a lender's security interest exemption became
void by merely foreclosing on, and taking title to, a contaminated property
where it holds a security interest. 5
If a lender's acquisition during
foreclosure was temporary and the lender sought to sell or otherwise divest the
foreclosed property in a reasonably expeditious manner, the lender could do
several things without losing its exemption. The lender could purchase the
property at a foreclosure sale, 276 acquire or assign title to the property in lieu
of foreclosure, 2' or, in the case of a lease financing transaction, repossess the

271. The rule's general test for participation in management provided that the borrower would
only lose the exemption if it
(i) exercises decisionmaking control over the borrower's environmental compliance, [in]
such [a way] that the [lender undertakes] responsibility for the borrower's hazardous
substance handling or disposal practices; or
(ii) exercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's
enterprise, such that the holder has assumed or manifested responsibility for the overall
management of the enterprise encompassing the day-to-day decisionmaking of the
enterprise with respect to:
(A) Environmental compliance or
(B) All . . . of the operational . . . aspects of the enterprise other than
environmental compliance. Operational aspects of the enterprise include
functions-such [as] that of facility or plant manager, [personnel] manager,
[controller, chief financial officer, or similar functions].

Id. § 300.1100(c)(1).
272. Id. § 300.1 100(c)(l)(i). The EPA intended the general test to serve as a framework for
analyzing the propriety of a lender's actions within the limitations of the exemption. 57 Fed. Reg.
18,344, 18,358 (1992).
273. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)Cii)(1994).
274. Id. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(A),(B). The rule covered two situations: where the lender
controlled or directed the facility's environmental compliance activities; and where the lender's
actions indicated that it had assumed responsibility for other aspects of the facility's operations at
the level of a facility manager.
275. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(l) (1994). Consistent with the holding in Maryland Bank, the
EPA rule allowed foreclosure when the lender did not hold the property for an extended period of
time without making an attempt to sell it. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,361 (1992).
276. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(l) (1994).
277. Id.
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property. 27
A lender would not meet its obligation of attempting to divest itself of
property in a reasonably expeditious manner if it rejected, refused, or outbid an
offer for foreclosed property that represented "fair consideration" for the
property. 2' Fair consideration' was defined as an all-cash offer that does
not include any unacceptable conditions, such as indemnification requirements,
and does not require the lender to breach any duties that it owes to other parties
like the borrower or other lenders."'
The rule further defined fair
consideration in such a way that lenders were not required to take any less than
they were owed on the property.'
No time requirements were imposed by the rule for the sale or disposition
of the property, provided the lender actively and continuously tried to sell the
property. A bright-line test was created where a lender could establish that it
was attempting to divest itself of the property in a reasonably expeditious

278. Id. The lender could also acquire a right to possession or title to the property; or use any
other formal or informal method to acquire the borrower's collateral for later disposition in partial
or full satisfaction of the underlying obligation. Id.
279. Id. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(ii). The purpose of the "fair consideration" aspect of the rule was
to determine when a lender inappropriately rejected offers for foreclosed property. 57 Fed. Reg.
18,344, 18,365 (1992).
280. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)(ii)(1994). -Fair consideration" reflected the amount that was
necessary to recover the security interest in the property. Id. The United States could seek to
recover any windfall or excess amount that unjustly enriched a lender. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,365
(1992).
281. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)(ii)(A) (1994) provides in part:
The value of the security interest is calculated as an amount equal to or in excess of the
sum of the outstanding principal . . . owed to the holder immediately preceding the
acquisition of full title ... pursuant to foreclosure and its equivalents, plus any interest,
rent or penalties . . . plus all reasonable and necessary costs, fees, or other charges
incurred by the holder incident to work out, foreclosure and its equivalents, retention,
maintaining the business activities of the enterprise, preserving, protecting and preparing
the vessel or facility prior to sale, re-lease of property held pursuant to a lease financing
transaction . . . or other disposition, plus response costs incurred under section
107(d)(1) of CERCLA or at the direction of an on-scene coordinator; less any amounts
received by the holder in connection with any partial disposition of the property, net
revenues received as a result of maintaining the business activities of the enterprise, and
any amounts paid to the borrower subsequent to the acquisition of full title . . . pursuant
to foreclosure and its equivalents. In the case of a holder maintaining indicia of
ownership primarily to protect a junior security interest, fair consideration is the value
of all outstanding higher priority security interests plus the value of the security interest
held by the junior holder, each calculated as set forth in the preceding sentence.
282. Id.
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months of acquiring marketable title, with a broker, dealer, or agent who deals
with the same type of property.2
Alternatively, a lender could advertise the
property for its sale or disposition at least once a month in either a real estate
publication or a trade or other suitable publication, or a newspaper of general
circulation covering the area where the property was located.'
The rule then
said, if the lender "outbids, rejects, or fails to consider an offer of fair
consideration" for the facility, such action is not considered taken primarily to
protect a security interest and the exemption is lost.2' The bright-line test
took effect six months after the lender either acquired marketable title or
forclosed on the property. If the lender failed to diligently acquire marketable
title, the lender had ninety days to consider "bona fide"'5 7 offers to sell the
property.' 5
Lenders could also undertake certain activities without losing the security
interest exemption.'
First, a lender could take action to prevent future
releases of hazardous substances.'
Second, the lender could remove drums
from the site without incurring liability. 291 Third, a lender that foreclosed on
a property could wind-up operations at the facility including actions that were
necessary to close down a facility's operations, secure the site, and otherwise
protect the value of the foreclosed asset for sale or liquidation? 2 Under the
rule, a lender could continue operating the business activities of a facility that
had been foreclosed if the lender determined that it was appropriate to do so,
provided the lender sought to sell or liquidate the property as otherwise
required.'
A lender could have also incurred liability independent of its status as an
owner or operator.' 9 Even if the lender complied with the pre-foreclosure
requirements of the rule, the lender could still incur liability if it arranged for

284. Id.
285. Id.

286. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)(ii) (1992). The exemption is lost in such situations, except
where the lender's action was required by law. Id.
287. A written, bona fide, firm offer meant "a legally enforceable, commercially reasonable,

cash offer . . . from a ready, willing, and able purchaser who demonstrates to the holder's
satisfaction the ability to perform." Id. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(ii)(B).
288. Id.
289. See generally 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,378-379 (1992).
290. Id. at 18,379.
291. Id.
292. Id. Winding up was considered a protected activity because without such protection,
foreclosure was not possible where practical or commercial necessity dictated that the foreclosing
holder undertake such action. Id.
293. Id.
294. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(3) (1992).
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disposal, or transportation of hazardous waste. 5 Following foreclosure, a
lender that arranged for the cleanup of hazardous wastes was shielded from
In
liability if it acted in accordance with Section 107(d)(1) of CERCLA.
the
with
in
accordance
the
cleanup
other words, the lender had to conduct
National Contingency Plan (NCP) or at the direction of an NCP
coordinator.'
B. EPA Rulemaking Authority and the Invalidationof the Lender LiabilityRule
On February 4, 1994, the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the EPA's lender
The State of Michigan and the Chemical
liability rule in Kelley v. EPA.'
Manufacturer's Association (CMA)' challenged the validity of the EPA's
In a two-to-one decision, the majority held that the EPA lacked
rule.'
statutory authority under CERCLA to define the scope of a lender's
liability."' The court refused to uphold the rule either as a legislative rule or
as an interpretive rule.
The majority refused to uphold the rule as a legislative rule because
Congress had not specifically authorized the EPA to make regulations defining
The court rejected the argument that as the
the terms in CERCLA.12
administering agency for CERCLA, Congress implicitly authorized the EPA to

295. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(3)(i) (1992). 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(3)(i)provided:
(i) Provided that the holder did not participate in management prior to foreclosure and
its equivalents and the holder complies with the requirements of 40 C.F.R.
300.1100(d)(1)-(d)(2), during the period following foreclosure and its equivalents, a
holder in possession of a vessel or facility can incur liability [under] CERCLA in
connection with its activities at such foreclosed vessel or facility only by arranging for
disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance, as provided by CERCLA section

[9607(a)(3)], or by accepting for transportation and disposing of hazardous substances
at a facility selected by a holder, as provided by CERCLA section [9607(a)(4)].
(ii) Following foreclosure and its equivalents, a foreclosing holder that directs or
undertakes activities under CERCLA section [9607(d)(1)] or at the direction of an onscene coordinator at the foreclosed vessel or facility does not incur liability for such

activities.
Id.
296. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (d)O)(ii) (1992).
297. 42 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1) (Supp. V. 1993).
298. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
299. As potential litigants seeking cost recovery and contribution under CERCLA, the
petitioners "did not want to be foreclosed from recovering cleanup costs from those secured lenders
that the Final Rule exempted from CERCLA liability." Id. at 1109 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
300. The EPA argued that the court should uphold the rule as a legislative rule that permitted
the Agency to define the limits of lender liability under CERCLA. Id. at 1104 (citing 57 Fed. Reg.
at 18,368 (1992)). In the alternative, the EPA argued that the court should uphold the rule as an
interpretive rule entitled to judicial deference. Id. at 1108 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 18,368 (1992)).
301. Id. at 1108.
302. Id.
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promulgate regulations interpreting liability provisions under CERCLA. 303
The court held that the rule was not entitled to .judicial deference as an
interpretive rule because Congress intended that the courts, and not the EPA,
interpret CERCLA's liability provisions. 304 The court explained that an
interpretive rule simply explains an agency's construction of a statute' but
3 6
is not binding. 0

The dissent in Kelley raised several arguments that may reappear in
subsequent cases.'
The majority opinion is significant not only because it
invalidated the EPA's security interest exemption rule, but also because it
restricted the EPA from interpreting the liability provisions in CERCLA. In
response, the dissent argued that the rule should have been upheld because
CERCLA's language, structure, and legislative history suggest that Congress
delegated authority to the Agency to interpret the scope of CERCLA's
regulatory regime. In addition, the dissent disagreed with the majority's view
that the preponderance of the evidence standard in section 106(b)(2) reserves all
determinations of CERCLA liability to the courts.' Rather, the dissent argued
that final determinations of causation rest with the courts while the scope of
CERCLA's statutory coverage is subject to EPA interpretation. 9

303. The EPA based its argument on Wagner Seed v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
where the court held that the EPA "had authority to interpret certain language in section 106 of
CERCLA that applied to EPA's administrative responsibilities." Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d I100,
1105 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
The D.C. Circuit also rejected what it considered the EPA's strongest argument, that the
EPA's role in implementing the reimbursement provisions under section 106(b)(2) implies authority
to define liability. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1106. Section 106 authorizes nonliable parties that clean up
a site under an imminent and substantial endangerment order to petition the EPA for reimbursement
of reasonable costs from the Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2). The EPA argued that to
determine whether to reimburse requires a determination of liability. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1106.
However, the court held that Congress authorized courts to use a preponderance of the evidence
standard to determine whether a party whose petition for costs was denied by the EPA may
nonetheless recover. Id. at 1107.
304. Id. at 1106.
305. Id. at 1108 (citing United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir.
1987)); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
306. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (noting that although the EPA's construction of
CERCLA is not binding on courts, it is entitled to substantial deference)).
307. On April 11, 1994, the EPA filed a petition for rehearing. Respondents' Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestions for Rehearing en bane, Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
If the petition is denied, the government may wish to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
308. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
309. Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority's determination that the private right of action
that CERCLA confers on third parties is incongruent with EPA's authority to define liability. The
presence of a private right of action does not, as the dissent pointed out, necessarily indicate
congressional intent to designate to the judiciary, rather than the EPA, the sole authority to
determine the scope of statutory liability. Id.
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In the view of the dissenting judge, the EPA should have been entitled to
Chevron deference. 31
Based on the opinion of the dissenting judge, the
respondents filed a petition for rehearing that was decided on June 14, 1994."'
In its decision, the court reaffirmed its prior decision to vacate the EPA's
Lender Liability Rule."
The court again argued that the EPA lacked the
authority to interpret the liability provisions contained in CERCLA no matter
how ambiguous." 3 Subsequently, the respondents filed a writ of certiorari to
have the case heard by the Supreme Court which was denied on January 17,
1995. 3' 4
Despite the reasonableness of the EPA's interpretation, the rule was
nonetheless struck down. Lenders still face an uncertain fate with respect to
liability issues and Congress must address these issues. The fact that lenders
face the liability of their insolvent borrowers should entitle them to special
consideration. The following is a suggestion for a congressional proposal to
address the issues involving lender liability and resolve them in an equitable
315
manner.
VI. A PROPOSAL TO REDEFINE THE LIABILITY OF LENDERS WHO FAIL
TO QUALIFY FOR THE SECURrrY INTEREST EXEMPTION
This Note proposes to amend the security interest exemption by redefining
the parameters of liability as applied to lenders. To apply joint and several
liability to lenders who fail to qualify for the security interest exemption creates
inequitable results. Lenders typically become involved in the management of
their borrower's hazardous waste facility when the borrower is either

310. Id.; See also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984) (stating that an administrative agency's interpretation of a federal statute is entitled to
deference).
311. Kelley v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
312. Id. at 1092.
313. Id. at 1089. The court disagreed with the dissent in its original decision to invalidate the
rule that the EPA had implicit authority to interpret liability provisions contained in CERCLA. Id.

The court acknowledged that the EPA is authorized to prescribe the manner and form by which
owners and operators are to notify the agency of hazardous waste storage, treatment, or disposal at
their facilities. However, the court noted that such authority is isolated and does not extend to
authorizing the EPA to determine the specific circumstances under which a specific lender would
be an owner or operator and therefore liable for hazardous waste clean up. Id.
314. American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
315. The following proposal is an alternative approach that Congress may use to address the
issue of the scope of liability to be applied to lenders. Its purpose is to strike a balance between the
interests of the EPA and the lending community. First, the proposal would spare lenders the
inequity resulting from joint and several liability. Second, while the EPA may not be able to collect
all of the funds expended in a hazardous waste cleanup, lenders would still be forced to bear their
fair share when held liable.
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experiencing financial difficulty or after the borrower has gone bankrupt. The
EPA sues lenders because the borrower, the owner of the facility, is insolvent.
When the borrower is insolvent and the lender is held liable for the borrower's
environmental contamination, the lender may face a judgment far in excess of
should afford
its actual culpability. For the foregoing reasons, CERCLA
31 6
lenders special consideration in assessing their liability.
PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE AMENDMENT
TO THE SECURrrY INTEREST EXEMPTION: DEFINING THE

SCOPE OF LIABiLrrY OF LENDERS WHO FAIL TO QUALIFY FOR
THE SECURrrY INTEREST EXEMPTION

Scope of Liability
(a) Pre-ForeclosureActivities
(1) Persons covered. Persons317 who maintain indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest in a vessel or facility.
(2) Liability & Fault Allocation. Upon the finding that a person has
participated in the management of a facility sufficient to void the
security interest exemption, such person shall,
(i) be jointly and severally liable, as defined by the
common law, to the extent that the participation in
management is greater than fifty percent of:
(A) the decisionmaking control over the

316. Ultimately, business and industry would benefit if lenders were afforded special
consideration regarding their liability. Environmentally sensitive small businesses are particularly
vulnerable when lenders face the possibility of CERCLA liability. Madden, supra note 201, at 158.
House member John LaFalce stated that small business, as the backbone of the economy, faces
particular problems because of environmental risks to lenders. 135 CONG. REC. E1325 (daily ed.
Apr. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. LaFalce). He listed five problems that small businesses face
because of the environmental concerns of lenders:
(1) the inability to obtain financing for construction of new or expanding facilities;
(2) the inability to refinance existing mortgages with balloon payments coming due;
(3) the inability to refinance existing mortgages to reduce debt service or generate working
capital;
(4) the inability to use real estate as security for working capital loans; and
(5) the inability to sell properties not needed for current operations or vacated because of
relocation. Id.
Representative LaFalce went on to say that many lenders may be unwilling to provide
financing to businesses located in the general area where hazardous waste contamination exists, even
if there is no showing that the particular property or adjacent properties are contaminated. Id. At
the very least, the expansive scope of potentially responsible parties under CERCLA has made
lenders particularly cautious in their lending practices.
317. CERCLA's definition of the term "person" is provided in § 9601(21), which states: "The
term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) (1983).
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borrower's environmental compliance; or
(B) the managerial day-to-day decisions made at
the vessel or facility after the security interest is
obtained; or
(ii) be liable for no greater than twice that person's
percentage of fault if such person's participation in
management constitutes equal to or less than fifty percent of:
(A) the decisionmaking control over the
borrower's environmental compliance; or
(B) the managerial control encompassing the dayto-day decisions made at the vessel or facility after
the security interest is obtained.
(b) Post-ForeclosureActivities
(1) Liabilityand FaultAllocation. Upon the finding that a person has
foreclosed (or its equivalents)3 18 on a facility but has engaged in
conduct inconsistent with whose actions are the security interest
exemption, liability shall be determined as follows:
(i) if the actions of such person constitute participation in
management sufficient to void the security interest
exemption, a reviewing court shall apply joint and several
liability as defined by the common law.
(ii) if the actions of such person do not constitute
participation in management but fail to comply with 42
U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1), 319 such person shall
(A) be jointly and severally liable as defined by
the common law if such actions constitute greater
than fifty percent of the environmental damage
caused by the vessel or facility; or
(B) be liable for no greater than twice that

318. The reference to foreclosure "or its equivalents" includes purchase at a foreclosure sale,
acquisition or assignment of title in lieu of foreclosure, termination of a lease or other repossession;
acquisition of a right to title or possession, agreement in satisfaction of the obligation, or any other
formal or informal matter that the lender acquires title to or possession of the secured property. 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(1) (1994).
319. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994) provides in part that
no person shall be liable under this subchapter for costs or damages as a result of
actions taken or omitted in the course of rendering care, assistance, or advice in
accordance with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP") or at the direction of an
onscene coordinator appointed under such plan, with respect to an incident creating a
danger to public health or welfare or the environment as a result of any releases of a
hazardous substance or the threat thereof. This paragraph shall not preclude liability for
costs or damages as a result of negligence on the part of such person.
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person's percentage of fault if that person's actions
constitute equal to or less than fifty percent of the
environmental damage caused by the vessel or
facility.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The proposal is tailored in part after South Dakota's method for allocating
liability when a person is less than fifty percent at fault.3" Under South
Dakota law, any person found less than fifty percent liable on the basis of joint
and several liability"' may not be held liable for more than twice the
percentage of fault allocated to that person. 3" The South Dakota law was
passed in reaction to the inequity to solvent joint tortfeasors caused by the
imposition of joint and several liability. 3" The statute attempts to limit the
inequitable result that occurs when "less than half at fault" joint tortfeasors pay
more than their fair share. 3 u Moreover, the statute still protects the plaintiffs
recovery, but to a lesser extent. 32
This proposal applies only to lenders found liable under CERCLA who fail
to qualify for the security interest exemption. Moreover, it applies before a
court apportions liability. Finally, the proposal determines liability based on
specific guidelines3' and then directs the reviewing court to use equitable
factors that no more than double the lender's allocation of fault. 327
Similar to the EPA's interpretive rule, the proposal addresses the actions
of lenders in the pre- and post-foreclosure periods. In the pre-foreclosure

320. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15.1 (1984 & Supp. 1993) states:
If the court enters judgment against any party liable on the basis of joint and several
liability, any party who is allocated less than [50%] of the total fault allocated to all the
parties may not be jointly liable for more than twice the percentage of fault allocated to
that party.
Id.
321. The South Dakota statute applies to all tortious conduct, not just environmental
contamination. Id.
322. Id. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1987) (joint and several liability does not
apply to defendants who are found to bear less than 50% of the fault assigned to all the parties).
323. Steven D. Kelley, South Dakota's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act:
Unsettling Issues Regarding Settlement and Release of Joint Tonfeasors, 36 S.D. L. REv. 600, 605
(1991).
324. Id.
325. Id.

326. The reviewing court would look to either the lender's degree of participation in
management, or the amount of hazardous waste the lender contributed.
327. This would apply so long as the lender is found no more than 50% at fault. Otherwise,
common law joint and several liability would apply.
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period, lenders are held to a "participation in management" standard. The
proposal attempts to accommodate lenders that do not substantially control the
borrower's facility, but control it sufficiently to void the security interest
exemption. 3

First, the proposal addresses the situation where the lender exercises
managerial decisionmaking control over the borrower's facility. 3'
An
equitable allocation of fault is imposed based on the degree of control that the
lender exercises at the facility. The proposal protects lenders from joint and
several liability if their involvement in managerial decisionmaking is equal to or
less than fifty percent of the total managerial decisionmaking. 3 ° As an
alternative, a court has the discretion to hold the lender liable, but a lender
"
cannot be held liable for more than double its allocation of fault.33
' In
CERCLA cleanup cost recovery actions, both the EPA and the lender(s) would
332
share the burden when the borrower is insolvent.
At levels of managerial control above fifty percent, common law joint and
several liability would apply (double liability at levels of fault greater than fifty
percent would result in allocations greater than one hundred percent). Fifty

328. The practical problem is that despite all of the precautions, testing, and evaluation that
lenders take when transacting a loan, there is no assurance for the lender that contamination at a
property has not been overlooked or deliberately concealed. 135 CONG. REC. E1325 (daily ed. Apr.
25, 1989) (Statement of Rep. LaFalce).
329. This part of the proposal seeks to protect lenders who do not contribute to the disposal of
hazardous waste. Lenders whose actions are found to be beyond the protection of the exemption
may not have contributed to the environmental contamination at the site, yet must still pay for its
cleanup. Lender's whose control does not constitute a majority will not be subject to joint and
several liability.
330. Fifty percent was chosen because levels of control greater than 50% would indicate that
the decisions of the lender have controlling weight. If it is apparent to the reviewing court that the
lender has a majority of the control over the decisions made at the facility, then the lender would
be subject to joint and several liability. However, the inherent difficulty in the proposed liability
scheme is apportioning damages based on managerial control. A judge or jury would have to
determine the relative degrees of fault of each liable defendant.
331. Doubling the lender's allocation of fault accomplishes two goals. First, because the lender
would be no more than 50% at fault, the lender would never be held responsible for greater than
100% of the total fault. The proposal would not put the lender in a worse position than if joint and
several liability were applied. Second, by doubling the lender's allocation of fault, the proposal
recognizes the need to balance the competing interest in environmental cleanup cost allocation.
While the EPA would not be left to bear the entire burden of unrecoverable sums from insolvent
polluters, lenders would be relieved from the harsh results of joint and several liability.
332. Despite the enormity of the task of rehabilitating hazardous waste sites, joint and several
liability puts seemingly innocent lenders in a predicament. The threat of joint and several liability,
some have argued, encourages minimally responsible parties such as lenders to settle. See Burkhart,
supra note 12, at 390. However, the EPA could put forth completely unreasonable settlement offers
because the lcnder risks a far worse result if the case goes to trial. Empowering the EPA with a
joint and several liability only furthers the problems facing lenders with minimal liability.
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percent is a natural division because this proposal does not intend to make
lenders worse off than if joint and several liability were applied. In addition,
if a lender takes control of a facility, then it should face the same liability as the
borrower.333
The inherent difficulty in this proposal is in apportioning damages based on
the levels of managerial control that lenders exert. To apportion liability, this
proposal directs the reviewing court to follow the method of apportionment
commonly followed in comparative negligence suits. 33 '

In comparative

negligence suits, the jury is instructed to calculate the full amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff and then to compare the fault of each party.335 Next,
the jury is instructed to reduce the full amount of the plaintiff s damages by an
amount equal to the plaintiffs contributory negligence. 3' Analogizing that

333. McGaughan, supra note 15, at 126. If the lender effectively takes control of a facility and
its actions cause or greatly contribute to a release of hazardous waste, the lender should face
liability. id.
334. See Damon Ball, A Reexamination of Joint and Several Liability Under a Comparative
Negligence System, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 891, 894 (1987).
335. See 3 EDWARD J.DEvirr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRAcrICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 80.27,
at 188-90 (4th ed. 1987).
336. Id. One example of comparative negligence jury instruction provides:
The issues to be determined by the jury in this case are these:
First: Was the defendant negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged? Id.
If your unanimous answer to that question is "No," you will return a verdict for
the defendant; but if your unanimous answer is "Yes," you then have a second issue to
determine, namely:
Second: Did the negligence of (one or more) defendant cause or contribute to any
injury and damage to the plaintiff? Id.
If your unanimous answer to that question is "No", [sic] you will return a verdict
for the defendant(s); but if your unanimous answer is "Yes", [sic] you must then find
the answer to a third question, namely:
Third: Was the plaintiff guilty of some contributory negligence?
If you should find that he was not, then, having found in [the] plaintiff's favor in
answer to the first two questions, you will proceed to determine the amount of [the]
plaintiff's damages, and return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor for that amount. Id.
On the other hand, if you should find, from a preponderance of the evidence in
the case, that the plaintiff himself was guilty of some contributory negligence, and that
[the] plaintiff's fault caused or contributed to any injuries which [the] plaintiff may have
sustained, then you must compare the negligence of the parties, and return a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for a reduced amount, based upon the comparison. Id.
The proper procedure to be followed by the jury in comparing the negligence of
the parties, and returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a reduced amount based
upon that comparison, is: First, determine the full amount of all damages sustained by
the plaintiff, as a proximate result of the accident; next, compare the negligence or fault
of the parties, by determining in what proportion, figured in percentage, [the] plaintiffs
own fault contributed as a proximate cause of all damages suffered by the plaintiff, as
a proximate result of the accident; then, reduce the full amount of [the] plaintiffs
damages, by subtracting a sum equal to the percentage of the total you find, from a
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scheme to lenders in the environmental context, either the judge or jury would
calculate the full amount of the EPA's expenditures at the site. Then, the trier
of fact would determine the relative degrees of fault of the borrower and lender,
taking into account: the amount of contamination caused by the borrower; the
degree of control the lender had over the borrower's disposal activities; the
degree of control the lender had with respect to the overall management of the
facility; and the length of time that the lender had pervasive control over the
facility.337 The court need not reduce the damages because contributory
negligence of the plaintiff is not a factor when the EPA sues to recover cleanup
costs. Finally, if the lender is found to control fifty percent or less of the
managerial decisions made at the facility, the court would increase the lender's
fault by no more than double the lender's allocation. 3'
If the lender engages in impermissible post-foreclosure activities, the
proposal directs the reviewing court to follow common law principles of joint
and several liability. A lender that fails to qualify under the post-foreclosure
requirements enumerated in the EPA's rule is assumed to have become the
owner of the facility. This proposal recognizes that the lender is no longer
acting under the guise of the security interest exemption and should be treated
the same as other owners and past owners.

preponderance of the evidence, in the case, was caused by [the] plaintiff's contributory
negligence; and return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount remaining
(against all defendants that you find caused or contributed to cause plaintiff's damages).
Id.
Id.
337. Analogizing to the method of apportionment in the products liability suit of Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984), the judge or jury would follow a preponderance

of the evidence standard and determine the relative fault of each defendant. Id. at 427 n.8. In
Duncan, the judge issued the following instruction to the jury:

If, in answer to Questions _, _, and _, you have found that more than one
party's act(s) or product(s) contributed to cause the plaintiff's injuries, and only in that
event, then answer the following question. Id.
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the percentage of [the] plaintiff's
injuries caused by:

Product X
Defendant
Plaintiff Z
Total

100%

Id.
338. A judge or jury would determine from a preponderance of the evidence the percentage of
each defendant's fault as follows:
Borrower
Lender
Other Responsible Parties
Total

100%

The court could then increase the lender's allocation to no more than double, if the lender's liability
is found equal to or less than 50% of the total liability.
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the same as other owners and past owners.
If, however, the lender does not participate in the management of the
facility but fails to comply with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1),
liability should be apportioned equitably. Section 9607(d)(1) requires parties
that clean up hazardous waste sites to do so in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) or at the direction of an NCP on-scene
coordinator.339 Failure to do so can result in liability.
This proposal
directs courts to apply the common law principles of joint and several liability
when the lender's contribution to the environmental contamination is greater than
fifty percent of the total contamination.
If the lender's contribution is equal to or less than fifty percent of the
contamination, the court can hold the lender liable for no more than double its
allocated liability."
A court can follow a volumetric apportionment 2
approach to dividing the harm if the lender is found to have violated section
9607(d)(1) of CERCLA. When a volumetric apportionment is used to apportion
the defendant's environmental harm, the defendant must show that a relationship
exists among the waste volume, the release of hazardous substances, and the
harm at the site. 3

339. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994).
340. See United States v. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. 707, 718 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that
removal of leaking and corroded drums was not protected by the foreclosure provisions of the EPA's
lender liability rule because the removal was neither consistent with the NCP, nor done under the
supervision of an NCP on-scene coordinator).
341. The proposed amendment only affects lenders found to be equal to or less than 50% at
fault for the environmental contamination at hazardous waste sites. Two examples will illustrate why
50% is used as a benchmark. First, a lender who is responsible for slightly less than 50% of the
environmental contamination is protected by the amendment. For example, assume the insolvent
borrower contributed 51 % percent to the environmental contamination and the lender contributed
49% percent. Clearly, if joint and several liability is applied, the proposal would require the lender
to cover 100% of the government's cleanup expenses. But for a very small difference in liability,
however, joint and several liability would not apply under this amendment. The proposal
accommodates for this apparent inequity and would double the lender's allocation of liability.
Therefore, the lender would have to reimburse 98% percent of the EPA's costs, leaving only two
percent uncollected.
Second, at the other extreme, assume the insolvent borrower contributed 95% of the
contamination and the lender contributed only five percent. To hold the lender 100% responsible
for the government's cleanup costs would be inequitable. This proposal would double the lender's
allocation to 10%, leaving 90% uncollected.
Although the result seems unfair from the
government's perspective, to hold the lender entirely responsible would be far more unfair. The
government can internalize environmental cleanup costs far easier than lenders.
342. See Moore, supra note 119, at 10,535.
343. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 172 & n.25 (4th Cir. 1988). Harm may be
apportioned volumetrically if it can be shown or assumed that no separate, independent factor
affected the environment. Moore, supra note 119, at 10,535. After the court hears testimony on
the apportionment of each defendant's harm, the court would instruct the lender to submit an
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3
To apply this proposal, the trial court's final opinion in Fleet Factors"
is helpful.'
The district court found that Fleet was entitled to the security
interest exemption for the pre-foreclosure period.'
However, Fleet engaged
in impermissible post-foreclosure activities when its agents prepared the site for
the auction of the foreclosed equipment.3 7 The court held that the activities
34
of Fleet's agents were not done in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1). 8
As the court stated, the contractors cleaned up the site haphazardly, "with all the
finesse of a Viking raiding party.35 9 Therefore, Fleet was found liable under
CERCLA as an owner operator. 0

The opinion does not specify the extent of Fleet's liability. However, this
Note's proposal would protect Fleet to the extent that Fleet's post-foreclosure
activities consisted of equal to or less than fifty percent of the environmental
contamination. In the trial court's final opinion in FleetFactors, the court found
Fleet's agent "seriously aggravated a conspicuous environmental hazard."35
The fact that Fleet's agent aggravated an existing hazard indicates that Fleet's
relative degree of fault was less than fifty percent. Under this Note's proposal,
the court would determine an accurate measure of Fleet's contribution to the
environmental hazard.352 The court would then, at its discretion, increase
Fleet's allocation of fault to a level not more than double the original allocation.
In sum, Fleet would bear its fair share of the responsibility for the EPA's
cleanup costs but would not suffer the potentially inequitable consequences of
joint and several liability.

court would ultimately decide the matter based on the evidence given at trial.
344. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
345. For a complete discussion of Fleet Factors, see supra notes 205-27 and accompanying
text.

346. The court said that Fleet's arranging for the shipment of the remaining SWP inventory did
not rise to the level of managerial control sufficient to void § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii) of the security
interest exemption. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. at 716-17.
347. Id. at 718-19.
348. Id. at 718. The removal of drums from the site was not done in accordance with the NCP
or under the supervision of an NCP on-scene coordinator. Id. The court also held that Fleet
engaged in impermissible post-foreclosure participation in management because Fleet's handling of
the SWP chemical drums posed a serious environmental threat. Id. at 719.
The actions of the salvage contractor also voided Fleet's protection under the exemption
because: (1) the contractor handled "hazardous substances in an impermissible manner; (2) it
seriously aggravated a conspicuous environmental hazard; and (3) it failed to complete its salvage
operations in a reasonably expeditious manner." Id. at 720.
349. United States v. Fleet Factors corp., 821 F.Supp. 707, 720 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
350. Id. at 726.
351. Id. at 720.

352. For a description of an appropriate method for apportioning the harm, see supra notes

334-43 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
An examination of the lender liability cases decided under CERCLA reveals
that the issue of joint and several liability was never analyzed. This Note
suggests that the failure to recognize the causal link between the lender liability
crisis and CERCLA's imposition of joint and several liability is the root cause
of the problem. Lenders should not fear being forced to bear more than their
fair share of responsibility for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site. Such fear,
spawned by the threat of courts imposing joint and several liability, has created
panic in the lending community.
The EPA attempted to address the lender liability crisis with its own
interpretation of the security interest exemption. Unfortunately for lenders, the
rule was struck and the only relief for lenders can come from Congress. This
Note proposes to limit liability on a more equitable basis. Lenders should not
be the last resort, deep pocket defendants that the government can sue for
reimbursement of the funds expended to clean up a hazardous waste site. Of
course, if the lender has contributed a substantial amount to the environmental
contamination, then it should be forced to take responsibility for its actions. But
where a lender's involvement is minimal, and the lender is sued simply because
it has the funds to reimburse the government, there should be limitations on
liability.
This Note and its proposal are directed only at lenders and CERCLA's
imposition of joint and several liability. The premise of this Note is that joint
and several liability puts lenders in a compromising position because they are
often the only defendants left with the available funds to reimburse the EPA for
its cleanup costs. While the proposal deals only with lenders, the problems with
CERCLA's liability scheme extend further, to other potentially liable deep
pocket defendants. This proposal attempts only to deal with lenders, but on a
practical level. Congress will have to deal with liability under CERCLA in a
more comprehensive manner. Nonetheless, the components of this Note should
serve as useful guidelines for the EPA and Congress when they reevaluate
liability under CERCLA.
Ronald Rothstein
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